The American Nation-Building Policy:

The Iraqi Case

2003-2007

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Dedication

I thank my husband Mr. Jean-Claude Talatinian, and our children Adriana and Jad to whom I dedicate my work. I thank my mother Souad Dawani Shatara for all her support; my father Salameh Shatara for all the insights and constant encouragement; Ramez, Raed and Rana for their unvaried reassurance.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

UN	United Nations
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
SCIRI	Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
S & R	Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations
UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization
UNEF I	UN Emergency Force I
PDD 25	Presidential Directive Decision
UNOSOM	UN Operation in Somalia
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
PKI	Peacekeeping Institute
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force :
ACJ	Allied Council of Japan
ICG	International Crisis Group
IMF	International Monitory Fund
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
SCAP	Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum- Exporting Countries
EU	European Union
ISF	Iraq Security Forces
PMO	Program Management Office
IRMO	Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
PCO	The U.S. Army's Project and Contracting Office
GDP	gross domestic product
NGO	nongovernmental Organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

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ABSTRACT

This is a study about the American foreign policy of nation-building, and its current implementation in Iraq. In 2003, the U.S. has occupied Iraq under the guise of fighting terrorism and Nation-Building. The U.S Administration's practices in Iraq have been consistent with its objective of nation-building; the "self - interested multilateralism" concept.

The two successes of the U.S nation-building efforts in Germany and Japan came after an end of long wars, with huge capacity and extensive pre-planning on the ground for post war initiatives. There was legitimacy empowered by little anti-Americanism, and most importantly the U.S. intentions were rarely questioned whether domestically or abroad.

The level of success in nation-building as contended by scholars depends mostly on the level of effort by nation-builders in terms of time, money, and manpower, assuming the intention is rebuilding and strengthening societies after conflict. However, this study argues that the U.S. policies and practices in Iraq are going to change that determinant principle of success due to the following reasons:

1- The U.S. invaded Iraq unilaterally, without the international community's consent for the mission, except for some countries, who happen to have economical and strategic interests in Iraq, and were given secondary duties in security and the oil sector.
2- The American strategy of nation-building in Iraq has been driven by capacity, matching means to ends, with very little pre-planning on the ground.
3- None of the nation-building best common practices have been utilized in Iraq, mainly; engaging the Iraqi people in the rebuilding process, proper representation, deliberation, or constitutionalization. At the same time, they attempted to appoint former Iraqi exiles as member of the transitional government under suspicion of the Iraqi people.
4- The study, however shows that some proper practices have been utilized and were necessary to achieve the U.S. political, economical and strategic interests, including more troops, money and time, but all pursued without any consideration to Iraq's national interests which might further explain the U.S failure in Iraq.

The above mentioned reasons could lead us to the conclusion that invading Iraq appears to be one of the worst decisions in American political history that can be envisioned as a new colonial rule designed for the 21st century.

Introduction:

The concept of peacekeeping differs from nation- building; however, these differences are fading. Traditionally, the United-Nations' (UN) peacekeeping operations would precede and facilitate nation-building operations. The UN would conduct such operations only if the cease-fire has reached an end, and under the full consent of the warring parties involved, usually by positioning a force between them, monitoring the cease-fire, and helping to create some kind of a political space for negotiations between them. Consequently, proceed with nation-building operations.

The end of the Cold -War changed that perspective of peacekeeping and nation-building, to the United States' "self interested multilateralism", favoring unilateral, deconstructive approaches to nation-building to restore law and order and democratize the country.

Prior to the end of the Cold-War, the U.S. was fighting the spread of communism, and worked vigorously to rebuild Germany and Japan, the two relevant U.S. successes in nation-building that also secured the Cold-War victory. However, nation-building in Germany and Japan enjoyed some crucial factors which contributed to the American success in terms of; the country's level of economic development, cultural homogeneity, prior democratic experience, and most importantly - as contested by scholars- the level of effort invested in their democratic transformation, measured in time, money and manpower by nation-builders and the international community.[1]

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[1]. Dobbins J., McGinn J., Crane K, Jones S., Lal R., Rthmell A., Swanger R., and Timilsina, A. (2003), America's Role In Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq, Rand's publications, Santa Monica, CA, USA.pp. xxv.

The successes of Germany and Japan have not been matched yet. Of the 16 nation-building attempts over the past century, "democracy was sustained in only 4 countries ten years after the departure of American forces. [1]

In his speech before the UN General Assembly, two months after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush made the case for war beyond Afghanistan, into Iraq, and against all states that harbor terrorists. Four years later, and in his September 2005 speech addressing the UN General Assembly, the President assured his listeners that "all of us will live in a safer world" if the U.S. stays the course in Iraq and completes the war effort. The American administration believes that success in Iraq will enable them to win the war on terror. However, the war in Iraq bred terrorism, more fundamental groups are being born, and Iraq is becoming their safe-haven. Therefore, the U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations to turn Iraq into a democratic, prosperous country in a ten year period, as contended in any nation-building attempt, will unfortunately be a far fetched goal for the U.S. to achieve.

The U.S. created the current situation in Iraq, in parallel to the British war tactic in Iraq during the 1920's. The Divide et impera is a war tactic, developed by the Romans to cease full control and enslave the peoples. The U.S. gave power to a group of unreliable, suspicious Iraqi exiled personalities and installed the new government in Iraq based on sectarian divisions; the elections and the army were organized along sectarian lines. The U.S. decided which parties could run in the elections, giving the priority to those who emphasized religious affiliations, for instance; Sunni vs. Shiia, or ethnicity; Arabs vs. Kurd, and refrain the biggest non-sectarian party, the Baath party,

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[1]. Pei, Minxin and Kasper, Sara (2003), Lessons from the Past: The American Record in Nation Building, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24, May 2003. pp.2

from participating. Notwithstanding, Saddam's Baath party was a mixture of Shiia, Sunni, Arabs, Christians and Kurds. But whenever the representation in any government is divided by ethnicity or religion, stalemates are bound to erupt, and that was the downfall of the American strategy in Iraq. As was stated above, the Divide and rule tactic was adopted by the British in the 1920's in Iraq, and currently by the U.S.

Politicians within the government have very limited level of trust and support among their own population. For example, the Bader Brigade, who is a Shiia paramilitary organization affiliated with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who has strong ties with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, was given the interior Ministry, while Moqtada al-Sader controls Health, Agriculture, and Transportation ministries.

Iraq was transformed in no time, from a secular society into a place where religious and ethnic identity is what matters, and what the war is all about. Solutions as "soft partition" are floating from U.S. politicians and scholars', claiming it is not going to be easy, but it can be the best solution possible, after surrendering to the fact that the U.S. administration have failed to achieve security in Iraq.

This nation-building attempt is failing despite the massive U.S. effort in terms of money, time and troops to install security and achieve democracy. However, better practices by all parties involved, might achieve more acceptable outcomes. Therefore, through outlining the lessons learned from past American nation-building experiences, some helpful practices and recommendations will be drawn to be considered, for both, the American administration and the government of Iraq. The Iraqi national reconciliation solution should be advanced more vigorously by those who are involved directly and indirectly, to prevent the current lose –lose situation in Iraq.

Literature Review:

Two relatively recent reports have examined previous U.S. nation-building efforts in hopes of shedding light on what can be accomplished in Iraq. One is a book titled "America's Role in Nation-Building; From Germany to Iraq", published in 2003 by the U.S. highly respected Rand Corporation. A note on the back of the book has this statement from Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer, the U.S. civilian administrator of Iraq: "I have kept a copy handy for ready consultation since my arrival in Baghdad and recommend it to anyone who wishes to understand or engage in [nation-building activities]."

The other report is a policy paper also published in 2003 titled "Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building." It was written by two researchers from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper. A non-profit organization founded in 1910 by philanthropist Andrew Carnegie.

The reports agree that not every U.S. military operation constitutes nation-building. They disagree, however, on the definition of "nation-building." However, both reports consider the reconstruction efforts in Japan and Germany examples of nation- building at its best. The reports echo each other in calling nation-building in the two countries "unambiguous successes" that "set a standard" that "has not since been matched."

In general, when reviewing scholars contributions and analysis in regard to the most recent American attempt of nation- building in Iraq, it is noticeable that none of the scholars have a positive view to what is happening or what might happen to the future of Iraq, it is obvious that the only supporters of the war and the only optimistic scholars are those who are part of the American neo-conservative party as obvious in Under

Secretary of State John Bolton's statement in 2004: " The bush administration is making up for decades of stillborn plans, wishful thinking, and irresponsible passivity. After many years of hand-wringing with the vague hope to find shelter from gathering threats, we are now acting decisively. We will no longer accept being dispirited by difficult problems that have no immediate answer." (Cirincione, 2006)

On the other hand, the flow of information and scholars contending the war, warning a disaster in Iraq, and a U.S. failure is unlimited. In his book "America's Role in Nation – Building from Germany to Iraq"

Dobbins argues that: "It is too early to evaluate the success of the post conflict mission in Iraq, but its first few months do not raise it above those in Bosnia and Kosovo at a similar stage."

While Juhasz in her book "The Bush Agenda, Invading the World, One Economy at a Time" (2006) wrote: "Throughout his presidency, George W. Bush has guaranteed that we will live in a safer, more prosperous, freer, and more peaceful world if the United States remains at war and if countries throughout the world change their laws and adopt economic policies that benefit America's largest multinational corporations". "The Bush Agenda is a failure for all but its drafters- including executives of the largest multinational corporations. It is a danger for the rest of the world."

Juhasz also wrote that: "It is the work of some of the country's most durable politicians, including Dick Cheney, Zalmay Khalilzad, Eric Edelman, Robert Zoellick, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Doughlas Feith, Richard Perle, and Condoleezza Rice. It is also supported by current and former executives at the world's most powerful corporations, including Chevron, Halliburton, and Lockheed Martin."

About the future of Iraq, Dodge wrote in his book, "Inventing Iraq" (2003) the following: "In the medium-term, Iraq will be prone to insecurity- mitigated only by the degree of ruthlessness and efficiency exhibited by the new rulers in Baghdad. The long –term result can be expected, at best, to resemble Egypt, with a population demobilized and resentful. The state will dominate society through the use of high levels of organized violence. The governing elite will colonize all aspects of the economy and corruption will be the major source of the regime's longevity."

About the ethical aspect of the War on Iraq, Feldman wrote in his book "What We Owe Iraq" 2004 the following: "Abortive nation-building, whether abandoned cynically or naively, promises Iraqis disaster, not yet improved. That the British abandoned their nation-building project in Iraq knowing full well that it was not completed had much to do with the subsequent miseries suffered by Iraqis- and that is an ethical burden too heavy for any nation builder to bear. Even if we wanted to leave soon after sovereignty was transferred, then, we would not be ethically free to do so. The costs of premature withdrawal are just too great." Feldman also argued that "It has often appeared in recent months that the skies over Iraq are darkening and that civil war is imminent. Decisions have been taken that cannot be withdrawn, things done that cannot be undone. It has been almost unbearably frustrating to see the U.S. government make avoidable mistakes, often unwittingly and sometimes cynically, and to see Iraqis following paths that may lead to violence rather than peaceful resolution. But this sort of situation, when the mess is already made, and the next steps are not perfectly clear, is precisely the time when ethical analysis is most necessary. Moral amnesia is no route to a clear conscience."

Chomsky in his book "Hegemony Or Survival" 2003, presents an irrefutable analysis of America's pursuit of total domination and the catastrophic consequences that are sure to follow, from the funding of repressive regimes to the current "war on terror", from the toppling of governments opposing its belief to the invasion of Iraq, "America pursues its global strategy no matter what the cost." Chomsky reveals the

true motives behind America's quest for dominance – and seeks to show us how the world may yet step back from the brink.

From the International Crisis Group-ICG- Middle East Report # 30, 2 September 2004, Reconstructing Iraq, we can learn how security in Iraq still hinders economic activity and reconstruction, and how the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) performance in Iraq fell far short of expectations and needs and offers a fragile, dysfunctional legacy on which to built, they simply made the hard job harder.

Despite the graveness of the situation in Iraq, The Iraq Study Group Report's ten members, including James Baker and Lee II Hamilton, presented their report to the president, and the congress about a new approach, and recommendations "for actions to be taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region." Recommending "a change in the primary mission of the U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly", and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region. These two recommendations for the American administration are equally important and reinforce one another. The report recommends the Iraqi government to move forward with national reconciliation, to enable the Iraqis to have an opportunity for a better future. The Study Group recommendations can easily

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put an end to this crisis; however, the possibility of national reconciliation in Iraq will be tackled in this study.

Washington, DC Independent Media Center: http://dc.indymedia.org, "The Real but Unspoken Reason for Iraq War", by W. Clark who wrote about –an Oil Currency War- as one significant reason the U.S. decided to invade Iraq and topple Saddam's regime, after Saddam decided to convert to Euro, and change the reserve oil currency from Dollar to Euro, which meant an American economic disaster, especially that other OPEC members are thinking the same, namely Venezuela and Iran.

From the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, and the Conflict Studies Research Centre, Graeme P Herd wrote a paper in October 2005, about the possible outcomes of the Iraqi nation- building operation. The paper is entitled; "Weak Authoritarianism and Iraqi State Building", where he wrote: "this outcome is in the strategic interest of Saudi Arabia and Iran. It reduces pressure on the reform process, weakens the prospect of Iraq emerging as a united strategic competitor, keeps the U.S. engaged in the region but with reduced leverage and not focused primarily on Iran, Saudi reform or Syria and it limits the threat that home-grown but exported jihadis pose for these status-quo regimes."

A Repot submitted from the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), to the Congressional Committees entitled: "Securing, Stabilizing, And Rebuilding Iraq; Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks", September 2007. The GAO did this study because the Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1, 2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the

achievement of these benchmarks. The benchmarks stem from the commitment first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. To complete their work, GAO reviewed officials from U.S. agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. They also made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007. Their analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits GAO has completed since 2003.

What is going to distinguish this study from previous studies is that the "level of effort"; which scholars agree that it seems to be the most significant criteria for success in Nation-Building, unfortunately, would not be applicable in the Iraqi case. The Iraqi case is unprecedented, and it is going to take much more than the "level of effort" by nation-builders to bring about fundamental societal transformations and democracy in 10 years time. However, failure for the U.S. in nation-build the country does not mean that the U.S lost the war. Victory can take many shapes from the outside; success for the U.S. Administration might simply means; dividing Iraq into weak authoritarianism, gain geo-strategic control of Iraq along with its 2nd largest proven oil reserves, and pre-empt further OPEC momentum towards the euro as an oil transaction currency standard. Whilst, stabilizing, securing and rebuilding Iraq would be negotiable, as long as the American bases in Iraq are secured, and goals are met.

Methodology of the Study:

The nature of the study imposed on using the following methods:

1. The Historical Method:

Historical events are documented in order to provide a record of what happened at particular periods during the implementation of the American nation-building policy, specifically in Germany and Japan.

2. The Theoretical Method:

Two theories go under this method, and are related to this study:

a- Realism theory; the main point of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power, political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action, but also aware of the tension between morality and politics that would explain the correlation between nation-building and self-interested multilateralism.

b- Neoconservatism; neoconservatives believe in the big-stick diplomacy, that they can reshape the world with the power they possess according to their interest. Furthermore, they believe that international politics operates according to the "bandwagoning" logic; the world will fear challenging the United States, consequently, they will throw up their hands and jump on the American bandwagon. Neoconservatives also argued that the root of the problem is the absence of democracy in the Middle East to combat terrorism. The Bush Doctrine insists on spreading democracy in the Middle East, Iraq would be the first major effort, and the rest will follow (the Domino Effect theory). Neoconservatism explains the U.S. decision to use its military power to reshape Iraq, and control the region.

4. The Comparative Method:

This method has been used in this study to compare the U.S. successes in nation-building missions with their current mission in Iraq, in terms of the country's level of economic development, cultural homogeneity, prior democratic experience, and the level of effort invested in their democratic transformation. These comparisons will explain the reasons behind the failure of the mission in Iraq.

Concepts of the Study:

Nation-Building: "Nation Building refers to t⁽he process of constructing or structuring a nation using the power of the state, especially a foreign one. This process aims at the unification of the people or peoples within the state so that it remains politically stable and viable in the long run. Nation-building can involve the use of propaganda or major infrastructure development to foster social harmony and economic growth." [1]

Recently, it's been used to describe "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict too. And more recently- as a political correctness to the term- it's been known as the "Stabilization & reconstruction Operations" S&R, as evident in the former Secretary of State Colin Powell creation of a new unit in his department 'The Office of (S&R) Operations', giving greater focus to the field, for Iraq is the sixth nation-building attempt in a period of little more than a decade, and in each case, the major combat lasted few weeks, while the stabilizing operations that followed lasted for years. [2]

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[1]. Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. Entered 6/11/2006
[2]. Dobbins J., McGinn J., Crane K, Jones, Lal R., Rthmell A., Swanger R., and Timilsina, A. (2003), America's Role In Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq. Rand's publications, Santa Monica, CA, USA. pp. 220

Democracy: It is when the Political power is vested in people. It can be transferable under certain conditions. [1]

Weinberger-Powell Doctrine: established in 1984, by then- Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. The doctrine outlined six conditions that must be met before U.S. forces are deployed abroad: 1- there is an important U.S. interest at stake; 2- the U.S. is in a position to commit sufficient resources to win; 3- the objectives are clearly defined; 4- the U.S. is willing to sustain the commitment; 5- there is a reasonable expectation that the congress and the general public will support the operation;

6- Alternatives have proven ineffective.

Generally, this policy discourages U.S. participation in multilateral engagements, unless the operation directly advances American objectives.[2]

Clinton's Presidential Directive Decision (PDD 25): established in 1994, required the U.S. to take on a watered-down version of multilateralism, where the U.S. would join the multinational forces only if the conflict in hand is directly related to national self-interest.[3]

Deliberation: it is the act of deciding between actors, through providing public reasons for their positions and decisions for others to understand, in hope to reach the "general will", as Aristotle initiated.[4]

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[1] Dobbins, et al, (2003), pp. 51

[2]. Vuong, Quynh-Nhu (2003), U.S. Peacekeeping and Nation-Building: The Evolution of Self Interested Multilateralism, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Vol. 21:804, EBSCOhost. pp. 808.

[3]. Ibid. pp. 813

[4]. Barnett, Michael (2006), Building a Republican Peace by the President and fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Security, Vol.30, No. 4 (spring 2006), p. 90

Representation: is not a theory of direct participatory or direct elections democracy, but rather "representative government within constitutional boundaries." As Machiavelli initiated [1]

Constitutionalism and divided power: the importance of the constitution derives from instituting rules that contain the exercise of arbitrary power, and limit hostility between different factions, and decrease the benefits of power.[2]

Checks and balances: a system that was identified by republicanism as an institutional arrangement that limits the exercise of power and its return. This arrangement does not only create a balance of forces within the political system for forceful actors to comprise and negotiate, but also creates political stability and legitimacy.[3]

The Problem Definition:

The mixture between the concept of occupation and nation-building is the essential problem. However, the war on Iraq and the American occupation has been portrayed as nation-building, although they are two distinct conceptions.

Importance of the Study:

The importance of this study derives from the evidence available that the U.S. Administration has not been using willingly the best strategies and practices possible in its current Nation-Building efforts in Iraq. The deteriorating situation in Iraq will lead to more wide spread conflicts there, the region, and the rest of the world. The importance

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 98
[2]. Ibid. pp. 105
[3]. Ibid. pp. 106

of the study also derives from the drawing of some helpful practices as recommendations, after outlining the lessons learned from previous American nation-building experiences. Even though there is no course that can guarantee success, but the scenarios can be improved.

The Purpose of the Study:

The purpose of the study is to search for the most important determine key principles of success and failure in Nation-Building depending on past experiences, consequently, try to evaluate the current U.S. practices in Iraq accordingly. The study will also try to give a better understanding of why the U.S. administration invaded Iraq, and why this nation-building attempt is failing despite their massive efforts.

It is important to prove the failure of this policy and its current implementation in Iraq.

Obstacles:

Ten years seems to be the time required to enforce peace, and an enduring transition to democracy in nation-building. However, it has been five years only for the U.S. occupation and their nation-building efforts; therefore, a definite outcome on the operation would be a premature judgment. Another obstacle would be the shortage of literature available about this subject, especially in the Arabic literature.

Hypothesis:

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been progressively more involved in nation-building missions. Scholars have searched, compared, and worked intensively to analyze the factors that would influence the success or failure, of which seems to be one of the most controversial American policies; nation-building. The results and conclusions were many; however, that most controllable determinant to influence success in any nation-building attempt was the level of effort, measured in troops, money and time. The case of Iraq in going to change that key determine principle for success within the nation-building policy, due to the complexity of the situation in Iraq, and more importantly, to the U.S. administration's unwillingness to use the best practices available in any given nation-building mission and ignoring lessons from the past to serve the neo-conservatives party's sole interests. The American success would mean total dominance of Iraq's natural resources and the whole region, failure, however, is not an option, and no matter what the obvious picture might look like, what really matters is achieving the American interests in Iraq and the region. On the other hand, Iran's interest in Iraq is not solely the oil; it is primarily achieving regional hegemony. The correlation between American nation-building and the concept of self interested multilateralism would explain the U.S. ill planned practices in Iraq.

Questions:

1. Is there a correlation between nation-building and self interested multilateralism?

2. What factors contributed to the U.S. law rate of success in Nation-building?

3. How can we compare Germany and Japan to Iraq?

4. Has the U.S been using the best practices of nation-building in Iraq?

5. What are the chances for Iraq to achieve national reconciliation?

6. How are the neighboring countries contributing to the situation in Iraq?

7. Under which of the two criteria; success or failure would Iraq fall into?

Chapter One

Nation Building

Nation-building missions usually involve a combination of national, international, and multinational actors, and the integration of their efforts. However, in great missions, it needs many layers of consultative machinery to ensure effectiveness.

The UN provides the most suitable institutional framework for almost all nation-building missions. The UN does not do invasions, but for missions that require forced entry, or that require more troops than the UN capacity, a coalition led by an alliance or the NATO will be necessary. Although the NATO military capacity is much higher than the UN, but the UN possess the aspects needed for any fruitful nation-building operation such as the different universal mechanisms.[1]

The most important objective in any given nation-building effort is to make violent societies peaceful, and not the poor prosperous, or authoritarian ones democratic.[2]

There are two alternative approaches to prompt reforms and nation-building:

1. The "Co-option" approach; as in Japan; where the intervening country try to work within existing institutions, and try to deal with all social forces and power centres to lead them by diplomacy. Most UN interventions desire this approach.

2. The "deconstruction" approach; as in Germany and currently Iraq; where state equipments are dismantled, and new ones built. Subsequently, some groups are going to

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[1]. Dobbins J., Jones S., Crane K., and DeGrasse B.C. (2007), The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, prepared for the Smith Richardson Foundation, published by Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. p. xxii

[2]. Ibid, PP. xxiii

be empowered more than the others. Most U.S. led nation-building missions adopt this approach. However, the co-option approach and peace building alone can not stop aggression, genocide, civil war, or the spread of the nuclear weapons,

nor can the intervening power stay neutral in conflicts.[1] While the latter is much more costly, complicated and needs commitment of personnel, money and time.

Section A: Priorities in Nation-Building

The most crucial time for nation-builders is the first weeks of the occupation. The intervention act by itself produces both; shock and relief in people, where resistance is not organized, and spoilers are uncertain of their future. Usually the capacity of the occupying authorities to take on all these missions in this limited time is overwhelming and limited. However, to seize-the so called- "golden hour" after the end of the military operations; the occupying authorities should be equipped with the minimum set of possessions; enough troops, police civil administrators, and humanitarian supplies to secure at least the capital.[2] Judicial experts must follow then directly, with funded plans for the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of rivals, and training the police force plans.

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[1]. Dobbins, et al, (2007), pp. xxi.
[2]. Ibid. pp. xxiv

Priorities within the mission should be;

1. Security; law enforcement, peacekeeping, rule of law, and the reform of the security sector.

2. Humanitarian relief; hunger, shelter, return of the refugees, and the response for epidemics. If these two priorities are not met first, then any economic or political development will not succeed.

3. Governance; re-establishing public administration and public services.

4. Economic stabilization; institute a stable currency, and install legal and regulatory framework so local and international commerce resume.

5. Democratization; institute different political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal constitutional framework for elections.

6. Development; adapting economic growth, work on poverty reduction and infrastructure improvement.[1]

The sequence of the last three priorities is not necessary. Nation-builders can resume activities according to profound studies and assessments of the situation and capacity. However, if adequate funding is available they should proceed in sequence.

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[1]. Ibid. pp. xxiii

Section B: Republican versus Liberal Peacebuilding

Remarkable international machinery and war readiness has been dedicated to peacebuilding since the early 1990's, especially after the evolution of traditional peacekeeping, aiming at building stable, legitimate, and effective states after war. September 11, catalyzed the emerging view of weak states as imminent danger on itself and on the international security.[1]

Liberal values dominate and guide peacebuilders activities or collective efforts as in; "liberal peacekeeping". Their common belief and objective is that the state must be organized around liberal-democratic principles, in order to have legitimacy. In addition, they believe that liberal states democracies are more peaceful and respectful toward their neighbours, and are the foundation of a stable international order. [2] Consequently, international organizations, peacebuilders, UN, nongovernmental organizations, and the World Bank have extended their activities and programs to that end around liberal principles. However, the peacebuilding track record is not impressive, and reasons for that are many, namely nation-builders can not create something like an ideal society after conflict, under certain conditions like limited resources, unfavourable conditions, or little time. Transforming all aspects of the society, state, and economy in a short period of time, and expect these conflict oriented societies to achieve what Western States achieved in decades, would be just another American dream.

Peace builders must understand that peacebuilding is state-building. Instant liberation put fragile societies under tremendous stress, and facilitates higher level of conflict.[3]

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[1]. Barnett, Michael (2006), Building a Republican Peace by the President and fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Security, Vol.30, No. 4 (spring 2006), p.87
[2]. Ibid. pp. 88
[3]. Ibid. pp. 89

States during or after war, do not necessarily have the institutional framework or civic culture to absorb the pressures associated with political and market competition, encouraging by that rivals struggling for superiority, through elections and free markets. Nevertheless, peacebuilders fear bringing around a voracious state, for them the best state is a limited state, favouring to strengthen the society, so it can contain the state; however different programmes directed at the state are working on helping it mobilize the means of coercion and develop its administrative capacity. Most activities intend on strengthening civil-society associations, the private sector, and societal organizations, helping individuals recognizing their collective goals. As a conclusion we can say that; peacebuilders have been concentrating more on building strong, liberal society than developing state institutions.[1]

Notwithstanding, liberalization prior to institutionalization can set free societal demands, with the absence of a developed institutional capacity to channel, organize, and respond to those demands, in consequence, instability and conflict will be generated.

Republican peacebuilding, however, stresses on the institutional foundations in addressing stability and legitimacy. They believe that the central challenge of postconflict state building is to create states that control the threats to stability caused by arbitrary power and factional conflict, and to encourage society to begin granting legitimacy on the new institutions. Republicanism pays special attention to the different threats to security, namely; the power abuse by the state arbitrary power that poses real danger on freedom.[2] In any society, factions are an eternal feature, however, some

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 89
[2]. Ibid. pp. 90

factions can create chaos, explode into conflict, or lead to one faction controlling and abusing the state power if not controlled.

Legitimacy is a central concern to republicanism as well. It is defined as "dependent on the use of proper means to arrive at collective goals."[1] Proper means is reliant on political processes that consider the varied interests of its citizens; that is, groups need to believe that their views are being included.

Republicanism appreciates elections; however, they believe that other bodies can represent different factions of the society. The Principle of deliberation therefore, is critical for engineering a successful postconflict process.

1. Deliberation:

Liberalism perceives the principle of deliberation as a bargaining process between actors in the pursuit of their preferences, as a result to their exchange; more shrewd strategic action might become available, at best, or in other words, act of deciding. However, republicanism considers this translation to deliberation as true and primitive. They see it as more of a demanding conception, though it is more important for liberalism how individuals consider each others views before making a decision, but first individuals are required to provide public reasons for their positions and decisions for others to understand and keep mind, in hope to reach the "general will", as Aristotle initiated.

Public deliberation encourages individuals to "escape their private interests and engage in pursuit of the public good." Although the decision-making process does not require full, equal, and active participation - not direct democracy- it does contain however,

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 90

means that force those in power to consider other views. In addition, public deliberation increases the view that the collective decision will have legitimacy; therefore, it will be accepted.[1] Deliberation can affect individuals' strategies, interests, and identities. Negotiations and deliberations might reconcile and create higher identification among former enemies.

However, some issues are better kept unsaid, and be removed from public discussion, especially directly after conflict, as trying to settle profoundly personal matters in divided societies, including the role of

religion in public life that might delay reconciliation and reconstruction. Furthermore, some decisions have to be made before considering any views due to security problems that make public deliberation physically impossible at this phase, key societal groups can help them bridge differences, find common interests, and develop a sense of community and common fate.

 Proper, functional institutions are crucial in post conflict for citizens not to seek security elsewhere, and cause more fractions.

2. Representation away from Elections:

Republicanism recognizes the importance of representation, as in the Roman law; "what affects all must be decided by all". However, it was not a "theory of direct participatory democracy but rather representative government within constitutional boundaries." [2] The demographic and geographic size of modern politics is enormous; citizens can not participate actively in all affairs. Elections are not necessarily the only mechanisms of

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 98
[2]. Machiavelli, quoted in Viroli, Republicanism, p.4-6, found in Barnett, pp. 101

representations; consultative bodies and transitional governments that can fulfil the functions of representation until it is time for appropriate elections would be an immediate significance to postconflict settings. The selection of an enlightened group, reasonably isolated from society, might help it escape some fanatical factions and gang rule, accordingly, put together comprehensive positions. These unelected bodies must meet two criteria; inclusivity or including diverse groups; and publicity, by making their decisions and reasons behind them transparent. By meeting these two criteria, they will acknowledge the views of others and meet minimal standards of representation.

3. Constitutionalism and Divided Power:

Republicanism set up the importance of constitutions as follows; instituting rules that contain the exercise of arbitrary power, limit hostility between different factions, and decrease the benefits of power. The constitution would have a higher degree of legitimacy if; there is an agreement over the rules of the game and the underlining principles that are to preserve the political order; institutions limit the exercise of power; and having rules that are difficult to amend.[1]

The checks and balances system was identified by republicanism as an institutional arrangement that limits the exercise of power and its return, recognized as; "the distribution of political authority that limits the possibility of either a centralized government exercising arbitrary power or a faction dominating the political system." This kind of an arrangement does not only create a balance of forces within the political system for forceful actors to compromise and negotiate, but also creates political stability and legitimacy.

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[1]. Barnett, Michael (2006), pp. 105

1Peacebuilders and practitioners unite around the necessity for divided government in postconflict setting. They came up with different forms of power sharing, believing that a relative inclusion of the most powerful elites and groups will help escape a winner-take-all dynamic, and lessen the chance that "losers" will become "spoilers" and return to conflict. Power sharing and divided government both work on the principle of balance of forces. However, the divided government setting distributes power across institutions and not specific elites or groups as in power sharing. The power-dividing strategy has a lot of advantages including; the endorsement of better democracy, separation of powers, and the establishment of an institutional setting that would not deprive particular coalitions of power. [1] In short, constitutional orders promote postconflict stability; therefore, they are a significant part of postconflict state building.

The legitimacy of the constitution depends greatly on the level to which it allows for participation, deliberation, and dialogue. The making of the constitution cannot be rushed by deadlines, it needs time to allow greater participation on all levels, therefore, the deliberative process give legitimacy to theconstitution and help create connection between former enemies, advocating more for the needs of the whole society than for their sole interest group.[2]

However, one –size- fits- all development policies are counterproductive in post conflict contexts".[3] Republican peacebuilding might not the secret remedy for nation-building. Thus, success in nation-building is dependent on many forces that are often beyond the control of any actor, therefore, concerns about the forms of deliberation and institutions mechanisms for a particular situation, cannot be tackled from a theoretical point of

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 106
[2]. Ibid. pp. 107
[3]. Junne, G. & Verkoren, W. (2005), Postconflict Development, Meeting New Challeng**es,** Colorado, Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, USA. pp.307

view, but through judgement learned by deep knowledge of local conditions and views. Nevertheless, republican peacebuilding supersedes the liberal one because it represents a better understanding for the nature of the postconflict environment. The essential task after conflict is to create the foundations for a state that; can constrain the threats caused by factional conflict; is controlled in its exercise of arbitrary power; and enjoys some level of legitimacy. Moreover, it is incremental; current peacebuilders are being criticized that they do not know what they are doing. "Grand plans can deliver great failures, especially under such uncertainty".[1] Current models of nation-building do not give credible attention to context, integrate all significant variables or description for their interaction effect, or prioritize different activities. Hence, Nation-builders should pay more attention to incrementalism.

Section C: Rebuilding is not Enough

Rebuilding preconflict structure by itself is not enough; it might reinforce differences and structural inequalities that gave the rise to the conflict in the first place, where some groups within that structure benefited more than others. However, it depends on the postconflict developers to change the balance and benefit all groups. Examples on that:

1. Representing different groups of the population in the security forces.
2. Opening government positions to all groups.
3. Installing and maintaining independent judges to install the rule of law.
4. Provide services to people in different regions and pave the way for development and recruitments,
5. Facilitate educational needs for the population and economy,

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[1]. Barnett, Michael (2006), pp. 111

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6. And more equal care in the health system, with concentration on preventive care.

Nevertheless, the following crucial questions and dilemmas in preplanning for any nation-building attempt should be answered by the intervening authorities:[1]

1. Who are the warlords? And how to deal with them? And what is their ideology? How can they be integrated, isolated, marginalized, or expulsed?

2. The democratization process, how democratic should it be? Especially in the immediate aftermath of conflict and how much authority should be given to an unelected local officials?

3. The Shadow-State and the relationship between the old and new power structures. In general, traditional leaders and structures are more powerful than the new ones, and enjoy more support, even if the new leaders are democratically elected. However, who should be supported? And if the intention is to integrate the two, what is the best way to do it?

4. Local judges or international judges? Who should be responsible for the rule of law? On one hand, local judges have more legitimacy, on the other hand there are very few judges left in the country, emigrated, or killed.

5. Economic, and infrastructure development; projects of infrastructure should involve great participation from the public, however, in situations of great pressure and instability, how can we guarantee the community participation from paralyzing the process and create the foundation for renewed economic development?

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[1]. Junne and Verkoren, (2005), pp. 309-311

6. The free media and its crucial role in the development of democratic decision-making. But since the free media has to serve its customers, it can perpetuate rather than change pre-war existing perspectives and opinions. So how can the free media stimulate change between the conflicting parties under neutral and independent media?

7. Investing in economic development; foreign investors might only invest in basic infrastructure, and hardly attracted to carry investment in conflict areas. The only source of capital would usually be from groups of the old regime. The question would be then; how much economic development should be left to these groups?

8. Donor's money and assistance, where should it go? Usually warlords control the most backwards areas, so, does not dealing with such groups mean more damage to these areas?

9. Public finance; in postconflict situations, revenues should be raised with ultimate consideration to taxes and other charges that might affect poorer groups, who can not hide or transfer their income unlike the others. Reforms in revenues that might affect the elite may fail, so where will taxes to finance development come from?

10. How to choose corporation partners? External agents should work with government agents, political parties, or with groups from civil society? Cooperating with the government might slow the process and reduce the effectiveness of a programme, while cooperating with the later two, might help further fragmentation within the country.

11. Establishment of a simple democracy; power sharing might reduce or stop violence; however, it can block further political development because a quota

has to be maintained, irrespective of the government performance and cooperation. Consequently, the democratic participation of the population would be threatened to become a mockery.

12. How to deal with undemocratic rulers? Supporting them would just add to the conflict, and campaigning against him could worsen the situation.

13. How long should the different international NGO's stay in the country? NGO's can make a huge improvements in so many areas such as the health situation in an emergency situation, but their presence might negatively influence the government's efforts to build up a public health system, so, should they leave even if there is not a sufficient medical services yet? [1]

14. How to match ends to means?

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 309-311

Chapter Two

The American Objectives of Peacekeeping and Nation-Building:

During his 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush promised to withdraw all American troops from all peacekeeping operations around the world, especially from Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia. However, two years later, the U.S. remained consistent with the Clinton Administration, and kept its involvement in peacekeeping missions. Reasons explain the U.S. continued engagement are many; but mainly the September 11, 2001 attacks; where the Administration started to reconsider its isolationist, and unilateral position, and pursued its commitment in peacekeeping operations around the world.[1]

Generally, peacekeeping operations and nation-building have been the responsibility of international organizations, specifically the United Nations. Because an action like that has been taken on behalf of a global organization, it not only adds legitimacy to the operation, but it facilitates the process in terms of sharing costs, providing troops and expertise as well.

Although peacekeeping and nation building operations are two separate concepts, still they are closely entangled. The conventional model of each being independent is fading. Generally, a peacekeeping operation would precede nation-building, to help facilitate a stable environment for nation-building to commence. Peacekeeping operations are

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[1]. Quynh-Nhu Vuong,(2003), U.S. PeaceKeeping and Nation-Building: The Evolution of Self Interested Multilateralism, Berkeley Journal of International Law Vol. 21:804, pp. 804.

conducted under the full consent of the parties involved in the conflict, and after the termination of the cease-fire. Traditional peacekeeping operations are usually defined as positioning a force between previous warring parties, to monitor a cease-fire and create political space for negotiations.[1] By distinction, nation-building operations include "measures organized to foster economic and social cooperation to build confidence among previously warring parties; [the development of] social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence; and laying the foundations for a durable peace",[2] or; as it commonly referred to in the United States; nation-building " involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors."[3] However, since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping operations expanded to consist activities related more to nation-building, namely assisting in implementing peace agreements aiming at producing long term settlements. These sorts of "multidimensional peacekeeping operations" have become more widespread. Traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping operations join four significant characteristics, mainly;

1- Both operations respond to international conflict, and are only deployed after the conflict has already begun.

2- Operations have to be authorized by the UN Security Council, and have to follow the mandate established by the Council. The fifteen members of the Security Council are the main oversight body for the peacekeeping operations.

3- Peacekeeping forces are created ad hoc, each time established under the direction of the U.N. Secretary-General.

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[1]. Ibid, pp.805.
[2]. Ibid, pp. 805
[3]. Dobbins, et al, (2007), pp. xx

4- All authorized operations are administered and coordinated directly by the U.N.[1]

In May 1948, the first traditional peacekeeping operation was established by the Security Council, the "United Nations Truce Supervision Organization" (UNTSO), to supervise a truce following the first Arab-Israeli war.[2] However, the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I), which was established in 1956, to supervise withdrawal of occupying forces, and act as a barrier between Egyptians and Israelis, is considered the first traditional peacekeeping mission. The mission established a basic set of principles and standards which have served as the fundamentals for the creation of all other missions.[3]

The American policy towards peacekeeping had two major turning points; firstly, the end of the Cold War and the first Bush administration's vision of "New World Order", which manifested the beginning of strong U.S.-backed UN peacekeeping force, with an expanded model of peacekeeping. Secondly; President Clinton's establishment of "Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25), which required the U.S. to take on a watered-down version of multilateralism, where the U.S. would join the multinational forces only if the conflict in hand is directly related to national self-interest.

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[1]. Quynh-Nhu Vuong,(2003), pp. 806.
[2]. Preface to United Nations Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/intro.htm (visited Dec.8,2005)
[3]. Quynh-Nhu Vuong,(2003), pp. 807

A. The Cold War Era

Mainly the United Nations' Security Council was responsible for maintaining the international peace and security. Their role in peacekeeping was minimal due to the escalating tensions from the Cold War and the U.S. veto against different operations. The U.S. then, paid the largest share of the U.N. peacekeeping expenses, and provided the advanced military logistics capabilities, allowing the U.N. forces to gain access to critical peacekeeping areas. However, the U.S. involvement in these operations fluctuated from the very beginning. During the 1970's the U.S. started showing frustration over the massive growth of the UN expenditure, and forced the UN to reform its management, while the congress decided to hold all its contributions to the organization, unless the General Assembly agreed to pass all future budget resolutions by consensus, rather than only requiring majority vote. [1]

During the Cold War years, the U.S. engaged in a military intervention on the average of about once every decade, while the UN peacekeeping missions were about once every four years. However, very few missions of both; the U.S. and the UN-led operations, developed into a full nation-building missions.[2] The American objective of nation building was to strengthen alliances against the Soviet Union, through creating stable, rich, capital driven, independent states, that was then called "the free world" against the Soviet Union.[3] The U.S. policy stressed on containment, deterrence, and maintenance of the status quo, however, promoting democratic and free market values efforts were conducted without the element of force. The military power was used to preserve the status quo, not to alter it; to manage crises, not to resolve problems.

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[1]. Ibid. at 808
[2]. Dobbins et al (2007), pp. xvii
[3]. Feldman, Noah (2004), What We Owe Iraq: War and the Ethics of Nation Building, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, pp. 7

Germany, Korea, Vietnam, China, Cyprus, and Palestine were divided. The U.S. and the international forces were used to maintain these divisions, not to coerce resolutions of the underlying disputes. Interventions in Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada, and Panama were carried out to expel unfriendly regimes and reinstall friendly ones, rather than bring about fundamental societal transformations.[1]

The American objective was not to build democratic states or to benefit their citizens, but it was for these countries to be efficient in helping the Americans with their global war- suffice to prove that of the U.S. support to authoritarian regimes from Southeast Asia to Latin America.[2]

Unprecedented American success was met in Germany and Japan, where the aim was to transform powerful enemies into allies especially that these nations had the capacity for unity, organization, and productivity, the thing that made the American project possible. By that, the U.S. did not only guarantee new powerful allies, but also guaranteed the Cold War triumph and restored the capability to emerge as the sole military power with the means to act unilaterally as well.[3]

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[1]. Dobbins, et al, (2003) pp. 3
[2]. Ibid. pp. 3
[3]. Feldman (2004) pp. 7

B. Post - Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a sudden increase of state failure. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union- supported a number of weak states for geopolitical reasons, for example; Afghanistan and Yugoslavia were considered important geostrategic spots. These regimes received substantial external support. However, after the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was not capable any more, and the U.S. lost interest.[1] The U.S. was not encouraged to preserve the status quo and totally free to avoid any instabilities around the world, as long as they don't threaten any of the American interests. With the Cold War behind, the American objective was not gaining allies against an easily identified enemy, but building stable, legitimate, liberal democracies, whose own citizens will not seek to destroy America, and preserve the status quo.[2]

The UN Peacekeeping operations have expanded to include activities generally associated with nation-building since the end of the Cold War. The U.N. operations had became one every six months while the U.S. military interventions has risen to about one every two years, and the duration of such operations has risen too- five to 10 years. As a result to the increased U.S. support, the UN expanded its multidimensional peacekeeping operations from its original goals of interposing some armed troops to monitor a truce, to observe, and maybe reject some small trans-border terrorist incidents[3], to include aspects as such as; assisting in implementing peace agreements aiming for long-term settlements of the underlying conflicts, "disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of

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[1]. Dobbins, et al, (2003) pp. 2
[2]. Feldman, (2004) pp. 8
[3]. Mohamed, Saira (2005), From Keeping Peace To Building Peace: A Proposal For A Revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council, **Colombia Law Review** Vol. 105 pp. 809

weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation."[1]

Gradually, these types of multidimensional operations have become common. The UN traditional peacekeeping operations were modified to guide the multidimensional ones. This shift reflected George H.W. Bush's vision for a "new world order", the vision which freed the UN from the Cold War impasse, and enabled them to "fulfill the historic vision of its founders; a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations."[2] However, and due to the difficulties and complexities of these multidimensional operations, great funding and larger peacekeeping forces were required. The U.S. policy was to keep the American troops out of these peacekeeping missions for many reasons; the unwillingness to put soldiers at risk unless there is a crucial American interest, against allowing the U.S. troops to fall under the UN command,[3] the lack of U.S. experience in such operations during the Cold War, and because of the " Weinberger-Powell Doctrine".

The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine; which was issued in 1984 by then- Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, reflected this policy, which outlined six conditions before deploying U.S. forces abroad:

1- There is an important U.S. interest at stake

2- The United States is in a position to commit sufficient resources to win

3- The objectives are clearly defined

4- The United States is willing to sustain the commitment

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[1]. Ghali, Boutros Boutros, **An Agenda For Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making And Peace-Keeping** , Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, New York United Nations, 2nd ed. 1995.
[2]. Quynh-Nhu Vuong,(2003), pp. 807
[3]. Ibid. pp. 808

5- There is a reasonable expectation that congress and general public will support the operation

6- Finally, alternatives have proven ineffective.[1]

In short, the policy discourages the U.S. participation in multilateral engagements, unless the operation advances the American objectives directly.

C. The Bush Administration 1988-1992

The first Bush administration of 1988, showed real enthusiasm in multilateral policies which brought hope for greater U.S. involvement in peacekeeping which differed from the traditional model, to include activities related more to nation-building missions. During the Cold War, the U.S. role was usually limited to support and transportation. By summer of 1992, the first Bush administration declared that "this limited role was no longer tenable and that, if the United Nations was to succeed, the United States would have to weigh in more heavily."[2] In response, the UN boosted its role in peacekeeping. The growth was too rapid to include missions such as; ONUSAL (El Salvador), UNAVEM II (Angola), UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNAMIC (Cambodia), UNTAC (Cambodia), UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait), and UNOSOM I (Somalia).[3] The (Iraq/ Kuwait) mission UNIKOM, for instance, was the first to be deployed against the host country's consent, while in (Somalia), the UNOSOM I stands out the most; for it has been Bush's first true U.S.- led multilateral effort to serve the aim of securing global peace and

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[1]. Correll, John T. (1999), **About the Powell Doctrine** , Air Force, Magazine on line, August 1999, Vol.82, No.8

[2]. Daalder, Ivo H. (1997), **Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping, in U.N. Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s**, ed. William J.Durch, Basingstoke: MacMilian Press, 1997. pp. 35-37

[3]. Quynh-Nhu, Vuong (2003), pp. 810

humanitarian objectives, without the condition of serving U.S. self interest.[1] Unfortunately, UNOSOM I and II responded to a famine caused by a civil war. However, problems emerged because of the weak U.S. response which was related to their modest experience in such operations during the Cold War, and to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine limitations on the U.S. participation, as mentioned earlier.

Bush I sponsored a new doctrine for determining whether the U.S. should use military force, but it was not clear how this doctrine would work. In his farewell address, he authorized a more flexible standard to determine on when the U.S. should send troops on peacekeeping missions.[2]

D. The Clinton Administration 1992-2000

President Clinton started his term with campaigns for a more interventionist policy on human rights issues, supporting the U.N. peacekeeping operations. Madeline k. Albright was appointed as the Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Ambassador Albright invented the term "assertive multilateralism", describing the administration's policy on foreign affairs. This policy required "continued, active U.S. engagement in foreign affairs with maximum efforts to share that burden with others, especially through multilateral institutions."[3]

The peacekeeping in Somalia, and the killing of American soldiers there, led to limit the U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations. UNOSOM II was considered a peacekeeping disaster. The failure in Somalia, accompanied with the political pressure

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[2.] Ibid. pp. 810.
[3.] Ibid. pp. 811
[4.] lbid. pp. 811

and negative press surrounded the Somalia operation, led Clinton to reposition the U.S. foreign policy, and switch tactics to authorize the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, signed in May 1994 became the administration's official policy on multilateral peace operations. The (PDD) 25 was "designed to avoid any future confrontations with congress over U.S. support of a U.N. mission, or participation in such a mission".[1]

The (PDD) 25 affected the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations, and established the standard by which the U.S. should determine whether to support a peacekeeping operation or not as follows:

1- Whether U.S. interests are being advanced, and there is international support for multilateral force;

2- Whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security;

3- Whether the goals of the operation are clear;

4- For traditional peacekeeping operations, whether a ceasefire and consent from the parties in conflict is required;

5- For peace enforcement operations, there must be a significant threat to peace and security;

6- The means to produce a successful outcome are available including funding, forces, and an appropriate mandate;

7- The international community has determined that inaction is unacceptable;

8-The projected duration is an accurate assessment, given the objectives and criteria for completion of the operation.[2]

In addition to the above mentioned eight points, the Administration must also consider the following:

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 812
[2]. Ibid. pp. 813

 1- That participation advances U.S. interests, and the risks of sending American personnel have been weighed;

2- Adequate resources are available;

3- The success of the operation depends on U.S. participation;

4- The role of U.S. forces is clearly tied to the operation's objectives;

5- The U.S. Congress and the American public support the operation;

6- The United States finds the command and control arrangements acceptable.

Finally, in operations which are likely to involve combat there must be (a) a willingness to commit sufficient forces to accomplish the operation's objectives, (b) a comprehensive plan, and (c) a commitment to flexibility in achieving the objectives.[1]

The adoption of PDD 25 left the Clinton administration in a dilemma between unilateralism and pure multilateralism. Generally, the administration decided to pursue humanitarian interventions under the U.N. auspices, if the interventions relate to a "vital U.S. interest". The self-interested multilateralism was demonstrated specifically in Rwanda non-intervention, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo interventions. Rwanda was a clear example of the effect of PPD 25 and the self-interested multilateralism doctrine leading to non-intervention. After the civil war between Rwanda's two main ethnic populations, the Hutus and Tutsis, mass murders occurred between 1990 and 1993.[2] The civil war became out of control shortly after Clinton signed PPD 25. The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was set to be deployed. Meanwhile, the events in Somalia occurred before the formal authorization for the mission was given. As a result, the U.S. refused to support the peacekeeping mandate; instead, the U.S. stood still watching the genocide that led to the death of

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[1]. lbid. pp. 814
[2]. Ibid. pp. 814

800,000 civilians in Rwanda, simply because the economies of Rwanda and East Africa are too small for the U.S. to justify a vast spending on weaponry and manpower.

However, The U.S. saw a vital interest with the European economies, and considered Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo interventions as a critical interest for many reasons: firstly; the Balkans are part of Europe's stability from a geopolitical sense, conflagration might spread to the whole of former Yugoslavia to the central of Eastern Europe, secondly; because Europe's economic importance to both the U.S. and the world economy and finally; the U.S. had to maintain its leadership at the NATO and participate in vital security operations in Europe.[1]

The difference between the Weinberger doctrine and PDD 25 is that the latter was directed at peacekeeping operations specifically, and required considerations on how much the success of the operation depends upon U.S. participation, while the Weinberger doctrine was more directed to the U.S. foreign policy.

E. George W. Bush Administration 2000- Present

It has been a major concern for the international community after Bush entered the office, that he will pursue his threats to pull U.S. troops out of international peacekeeping operations. Throughout his campaign, Bush always stressed that the spread of peacekeeping operations was harming the U.S. military by decreasing troops' war readiness, and that the U.S. would be "prepared to fight and win war[s]."[2] It seemed then, that the new administration was going to follow a different, isolationist approach

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[1]. O'Hanlon, Michael (2001), "Come Partly Home, America, How to Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad" Foreign Affairs Press Office, Mar.-Apr. 2001, pp. 2.
[2]. Myers, Lee Steven (2001), "Bush Warns Against Overdeployment", New York Times, Feb.15, 2001, pp. A26.

to foreign policy. Nevertheless, Europe's safety was vital to America's security, Bush later stated on a roundtable discussion with employees of the National Guard and Reservists, that "there will be no precipitous withdrawal from the commitments we inherited, but as we go forward we will be careful about troop's deployment, and judiciously use our troops."[1] It was obvious then that Bush would not withdraw U.S. troops from former Yugoslavia.

September 11 directly affected Bush's approach towards peacekeeping and Nation-Building. The Bush Administration continued to maintain disfavor towards U.S. involvement in peacekeeping as evident in many occasions; in June 2002, the Bush administration decided to close the Army Peacekeeping Institute (PKI). The functions of the (PKI) were soaked up by the Center for Army Lessons Learned. The PKI is now left with 10 person staff, and a $200,000 annual budget.[2] The Administration made plans to reduce U.S. military participation in the multinational peacekeeping force in Sinai, where the U.S. troops constitute almost half of the peacekeeping force,[3] and committed itself to aid the force financially. While in Afghanistan, President Bush was hesitant to participate in the peacekeeping operations there. Consequently, the peacekeeping operation- the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was formed without U.S. troops; furthermore, the U.S. opposed expansion of the ISAF to other regions beyond Kabul, or any increase in force size. Eventually, the U.S. administration yielded, and felt that by participating, their troops would leave sooner.[4]

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[1]. President Bush remarks in a Roundtable Discussion in Charleston on Feb.14, 2001, 37 Weekly Comp. Press, Document #7

[2]. Lobe, Jim (2002), Politics: Pentagon to Close Only U.S. Peacekeeping Institute, Inter Press Services, June 4, 2002.

[3]. From the New-York Times (2002), U.S. Plans to Reduce Presence in Sinai Peacekeeping Force, Aug. 3, 2002, pp. A4.

[4]. Gordon, Michael R. (2002), U.S. Backs Increase in Peacekeeping for Afghanistan, New York Times, Aug. 30, 2002, pp. A1

All these actions emphasized the notion that the U.S. would participate in Peacekeeping operations only under its own terms. This decreased involvement in peacekeeping is still consistent with the idea of self – interested multilateralism. On the other hand, the Bush Administration saw that Nation-Building is a critical concept on its war on terrorism as evident in its "National Security Strategy" in September 2000, which outlines the strategy against terrorism, and actively authorized the use of multilateral nation-building as a mean to fight terrorism: "As we pursue the terrorists in Afghanistan, we will continue to work with international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as non-governmental organizations, and other countries to provide the humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance necessary to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists." [1] Unlike the administration's previous position, the term Nation-Building has been used. The U.S.-led operations have become larger, longer and more motivated in scope; however, the strategy represents the current U.S. administration's continued commitment to the concept of self-interested multilateralism.

The American experience in this field is extensive. The current Iraqi operation would be the U.S.'s seventh major U.S.-led intervention less than a decade. [2] Operations in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, preceded Iraq. Having been in six Muslim societies in such a short period of time before invading Iraq, should have given the U.S. administration an unprecedented experience in nation-building, specifically in Muslim countries, however, Iraq looks like the biggest and most difficult challenge to date.

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[1]. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), pp. 7
[2]. Dobbins, et al. (2007), pp. xviii

Chapter Three

Section A: The U.S. Rate of Success in Nation-Building

Separating ordinary American military intervention from nation-building; three strict criteria must be applied according to the Carnegie report:

1- The practical effect or the declared goal of American intervention must be a regime change or the survival of a collapsing regime, which are the core objectives of the American nation-building to maintain friendly indigenous regimes to implement its plans; otherwise it would be merely colonial rule.

2- The second element of nation-building is the deployment of large numbers of American ground troops, because nation-building requires the lengthy commitment of ground forces to maintain the favored regime and perform essential administrative functions, such as establishing law and order.

3- A prototypical feature of nation-building is the use of American military and civilian personnel in the political administration in the target countries. Because of the deep involvement in the political process of target countries, Washington must have the biggest role in the selection of political leaders to head the new regimes. Consequently, restructures the key political institutions of the target countries such as; rewriting the constitution and other important laws, also participating in the routine administrative activities such as; public finance and the delivery of social services.[1]

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[1]. Pei, M. and Kasper, S., **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace** (2003), pp. 2

Cases in this paper are going to be based on these criteria, because the Iraqi operation

shares the same criteria. 16 of more than 200 American military interventions since

1900 were characterized as nation-building, through promoting democratic institutions

desired by American policy-makers, as described in (Table 1).

Table1: The U.S. Nation-Building Missions since 1900

Target country	Population	Years	Duration (years)	Multilateral or Unilateral	Interim Administration	Democracy after 10 years?
Afghanistan	26.8 million	2001-present	5+	Multilateral	UN Administration	?
Haiti	7.0 million	1994 - 1996	2	Multilateral	Local Administration	No
Panama	2.3 million	1989	<1	Unilateral	Local Administration	Yes
Grenada	92.000	1983	<1	Unilateral	Local Administration	Yes
Cambodia	7 million	1970-73	3	Unilateral	US Surrogate Regime	No
South Vietnam	19 million	1964-73	9	Unilateral	US Surrogate Regime	No
Dominican Republic	3.8 million	1965-66	1	Unilateral	US Surrogate Regime	No
Japan	72 million	1945-52	7	Multi-unilateral	US Direct Administration	Yes
West Germany	46 million	1945-49	4	Multilateral	Multilateral Administration	Yes
Dominican Republic	895,000	1916-24	8	Unilateral	US Direct Administration	No
Cuba	2.8 million	1917-22	5	Unilateral	US Surrogate Regime	No
Haiti	2 million	1915-34	19	Unilateral	US Surrogate Regime	No
Nicaragua	620.000	1909-27	18	Unilateral	US Surrogate Regime	No
Cuba	2 million	1906-09	3	Unilateral	US Direct Administration	No
Panama	450,000	1903-36	33	Unilateral	US Surrogate Regime	No
Cuba	1.6 million	1898-02	3	Unilateral	US direct Administration	No

Source: Pei, M. and Kasper, S. (2003), Lessons from the Past: The American Record in
Nation Building. **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**, 24, May 2003.

"Of the 16 over the past century, democracy was sustained in only 4 countries ten years after the departure of American forces."[1]

Democracy was sustained in Germany, Japan, Grenada and Panama. The first two were totally defeated and surrendered in World War II, the thing that appeared to have created a more favorable psychological environment for rebuilding efforts in the post conflict phase. Success in Grenada and Panama can be attributed to the fact that Grenada is a very small Island nation, with inhabitants of 100.000 only; while Panama's population is less than 3 million. Nation-building is usually less challenging in small societies.[2]

However, the U.S. nation-building efforts failed to achieve democracy in the other 11 cases (excluding Afghanistan) 10 years after the departure of the American forces. Therefore, it is worth analyzing the two relevant successes of Germany and Japan, and how did the United States and allies manage to nation-build such great nations successfully; and why they failed in all their other efforts.

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 1

[2]. Pei, M. and Kasper, S., **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace** (2003), pp. 2

Section B: The U.S. Two Relevant Successes

1. Germany

Germany surrendered unconditionally after World War II in May 1945 to the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom, who all decided to occupy Germany militarily. The US, France and the UK occupied zones in the west, the Soviets occupied the east, while the capital of Berlin was portioned among the four occupying powers. The allies shared a common policy developed in a series of summit meetings. The Yalta Conference in February 1945, called for:

1. unconditional surrender

2. the destruction of Nazism

3. the disarmament of Germany

4. speedy punishment of war criminals

5. reparations

6. And an economy able to sustain the German people but not capable of waging war.[1]

The challenges in Germany were the severely damaged physical infrastructure, the collapse of the economy in 1945, and the refugees. The situation created huge challenges for the allies, thinking how to manage the aftermath of the war.

On the ground, The Western Allies pursued nation-building in Germany as planned by demobilizing the German military, holding war crimes tribunals, helping construct democratic institutions, and providing extensive humanitarian and economic assistance. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) - which was the former US, British, and French zones- with time developed into a vigorous democratic state with strong

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[1]. Dobbins, et al (2003), pp. 3

www.manaraa.com

economy, although the early efforts were not consistently successful, nevertheless, these achievements took several years to develop.

As mentioned earlier, the US and the other allied powers planned the future and shape of post- Hitler Germany, extensively in 1944 and 1945. They determined to play a big role in transforming Germany into a peaceful democratic state that would never threaten Europe militarily. The drive was mainly influenced by the increasing power struggle between the US and the Soviet Union over the future of Europe- and Germany in particular.[1]

Military governments were established by the Allies, each in its own sector. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067 directed the termination of the Nazi party; demilitarization; control over communications, press, propaganda, and education; reparations for countries desiring them; and decentralization of the German government.

The Marshall Plan was passed on April 3, 1948. The U.S. European Cooperation Administration administrated the plan, in conjunction with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which eventually became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The Marshall Plan helped to rapid European recovery between the periods of 1948-1951. However, the period from 1946 to early 1948 was critical. During this period, the U.S. provided large loans and aid to a number of European countries, in addition to the help of some international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. External assistance

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[1] . Ibid. pp. 7

was needed for a period when the economies were not yet able to generate adequate export revenues to pay for the imports needed for recovery, as in any other similar case.

The U.S. Army under General Clay's command and his economic policies were the key to Germany's economic recovery of West Germany. They quickly and efficiently organized humanitarian assistance and started again government services and economic activities. The same was for the British zone, where efforts were as constructive. However, other zones did not recover as fast due to reparations paid to the Soviet Union, France, and other states. Each power in Germany set its own economic policies. The Soviet Union controlled the printing of German currency, Reichmarks and circulated throughout the four zones. As a result, German inflation came under control only until the introduction of the Deutschmark in West Germany, in 1948, depriving the Soviets from printing money. [1]

In Germany it has been proved that military force and political capital can strengthen societal and democratic transformation. The incremental process by the US, French, and the British efforts in building democratic institutions and political parties, which only began in 1945, helped succeeded in achieving durable transformation. The elections came after many years, and the powers themselves supervised the elections and the establishment of the constitution and parliament. In September 1949, Konrad Adenauer was elected as the first postwar chancellor of the new West German State. The West German population played a significant role to ensure this outcome too. Consequently, the Western allies granted the German political institutions and people, who continued to deepen the democratization process their full sovereignty.

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[1]. Dobbins, et al (2003) pp. 22

2. Japan:

The war in the Pacific, which Japan started in northern China in 1931, came to an end by the U.S. use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. Between the dropping of the two atomic bombs, the Soviet Union entered the war and began moving into Manchuria.[1]

On July 26, 1945 the final terms of surrender were agreed on at Potsdam as follows:

1. Unconditional surrender

2. A purge of leadership that had advocated global conquest

3. An allied occupation until a new order was established and Japan's war –making power was destroyed

4. The disbandment of Japan's empire

5. Military disarmament

6. Prosecution of war criminals

7. Establishment of freedom of speech, religion, thought, and respect of human rights

8. The reduction of economic capacity to prevent rearmament.[2]

The U.S., U.K, and China were party to these terms while the Soviet Union signed on after its declaration of war. To the Japanese Government, the emperor safety was of high importance. Their conditioned acceptance of the Potsdam terms would be on a guarantee of the emperor's safety. The U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes responded by emphasizing that the surrender is unconditional and that both the Japanese government and the emperor would be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied

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[1]. Dobbins, et al (2003), pp. 25.
[2]. U.S. Department of State (1946), Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, Far Eastern Series 17, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub.267, 1946, pp.53-55.

Powers (SCAP) upon surrender. The final form of government and the fate of the emperor would be left up to "the freely expressed will of the Japanese people."[1]

The United States predominant role in the final stages of the war against Japan made it decide to lead the occupation unilaterally. No zones or divisions, and no policy formulation and implementation slowed or blocked because of the need to build agreement between the parties, as in Germany. However, the Far Eastern Commission which was established in Washington was composed of the 11 countries that had fought against Japan to formulate policies to enable Japan to fulfill its surrender terms, and to review SCAP directives and actions, with no authority over military operations or territorial questions. While the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ), which was established in Tokyo and composed of; China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the U.S. would consult and advise SCAP. Like the Far Eastern Commission, the ACJ never became an effective instrument of policy and got weaker during the occupation. The two international bodies were agreed on in Moscow in December 1945, and basically composed for supervision and consultation.

On the Ground, however, the success in Japan was not evident overnight, in fact, the direct effects were chaotic. The autocratic U.S. general had more success at demilitarization and democratization than fostering an open strong economic system. Nevertheless, it turned a former enemy into an ally.

On the humanitarian level, the bombing of the two cities left 9 million people homeless, the national food distribution system collapsed where many faced hunger and

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[1]. Ibid, pp. 57-58.

starvation. About 3 million people were trapped overseas, since Japan's navy and commercial shipping was totally destroyed. Around 123,510 children were abandoned and orphaned. Likewise abandoned were the Asian residents of Japan, including 1.3 million Koreans, where many has been brought over as recruits to work in oil mines and other industries. Moreover, 30,000 Allied prisoners were held in camps as prisoners of war in Japan in need for basic necessities.[1]

The occupation was envisioned to last three years, however, General MacArthur believed that the framework for a new democratic system had been achieved and Japan is no longer a threat to the international security. He also advocated that work begin on a peace treaty, but the beginning of the Cold War and the Soviet insistence on being given a say in the content of the peace treaty stood behind any further progress, and the U.S. occupation continued.

Germany democratization efforts were facilitated by the fact that Germany already had significant experience with democracy, surrounded by three sides of well-established democracies, and was soon integrated with democratically based international institutions- as the NATO, and the European Coal and Steel Community. On the other hand, Japan did not have the same opportunities, but the speed and relative ease of the Japanese transformation had two primary causes; the U.S. decision to co-opt Japanese institutions and the unilateral process of nation-building- unlike Germany, where most institutions were abolished and rebuilt from scratch.

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[1] . Dobbins, et al (2003), pp. 27

Although the Japanese did not engineer the drafting of a new Japanese constitution, reorganize the police, or removed some in leadership and key administrative positions, but the occupation was managed through a fully coherent Japanese government, ranging from the emperor to the prime minister, ministries, parliament, and courts. What made the reconstruction process less troublesome in Japan than in Germany is that the occupation authority was centered in one nation, and one man; Douglas MacArthur and the SCAP, while the most two important bodies for oversight and consultation- the Far Eastern Commission and the ACJ, had little power, so more energy was spend on overseeing reconstruction and less effort forging consensus among partners. The failure in Japan to involve any of Japan's neighbors and ex-enemies in the transformation process was due to the lack of regional reconciliation; therefore, none was fully reconciled to the reemergence of powerful postwar Japan. In fact, Japan was not forced to break with its recent past, and the decision to pardon the emperor leaves the Japanese today less reconciled with their history, less willing to admit their war guilt, and less prepared to accept their neighbors- unlike the Germans.[1]

SCAP allowed more consistency and more dramatic economic policy changes than in Germany. In Germany the policymaking authority was divided across the four zones. In Japan, SCAP pushed through a land reform that destroyed the power of the land holding classes and turned peasants into property owners. SCAP also expanded workers' rights, and terminated the large business combines (Zaibatsu) who dominated the economy.

Tension existed between the U.S. policymakers who favored the democratization of economic opportunity and those who favored working with the existing economic elites

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 53

for a rapid economic recovery.[1] SCAP's actions were- breaking up the large land holdings, granting workers more rights and powers, and dismantling the largest industrial corporations, which seemed like it was obstructing rather than fostering economic reconstruction. But the U.S. global interests, the fall of the Chinese nationalists, and the growing recognition that Japan could be a powerful ally against communism, led the U.S. policies to change toward policies that would promote Japanese economic self-sufficiency and contributed to the strengthening of the political and economic power in Japan by the conservatives.

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 53

Section C: Figures on U.S Failures

In reference to (table1) of the Carnegie Report; the success or failure of nation-building depends mainly on these critical variables:

a. The Targeted Country's internal characteristics:

Four characteristics compliment the political engineering and nation-building efforts: First; strong national identity; it hurts if the country is torn into factions like deep ethnic fractures, religious animosities, and high levels of inequality. These characteristics make the country resistant to foreign political engineering, like; Haiti, and now Iraq, where the long time oppression and different ethnic groups are trying to seize power and trigger national disintegration. However, societies with strong national identity, homogeneity and socioeconomic equality are more suitable to nation-building. Second; Likewise, the state capacity is as equally important within these missions as well, namely; organizational effectiveness and discipline of the military, bureaucracy, and judiciary.[1] Nation-building requires local people to be available to take over most of the basic tasks of government. In both Germany and Japan, for example, most civil servants and bureaucrats remained on their jobs. In contrast, in Cuba, the U.S. managed the nation's public finance, drafted laws, pacified labour friction, and settled election disputes. In Haiti, the U.S. managed public health, the treasury, the routine government affairs, and suppressed local rebellions. In the Dominican Republic, the U.S. worked extensively on infrastructure projects. However, all that generated local resentment, and viewed as colonial rule. The Carnegie report says that outsiders probably cannot train people to do these jobs and that if outsiders take over the jobs, they may soon be viewed with hostility. Third; it helps if the country is economically developed. The Carnegie

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[1]. Pei and Kasper (2003), pp. 4

report stresses the difficulty of such efforts in underdeveloped countries. Historically, effective state institutions evolve physically out of the social structure, cultural norms, and distribution of political power of the given society.[1] Nation-building by outsiders can only succeed by fundamentally shifting the conditions responsible for the ineffectiveness of the state. Even long commitments can not guarantee success. For instance; the U.S. stayed in Panama for 33 years, in Haiti for 20 years, in Nicaragua 18 years, in Cuba around 11 years, and in the Dominican Republic for 8 years, and did not succeed. However, the Rand report (2003) argues that five years seems to be the minimum required to achieve democracy.[2] Fourth; a crucial variable for success would be if the targeted country has had "periods of constitutional rule--characterized by the effective rule of law and binding limits on the government's power." Germany and Japan had a history of constitutional rule, on the other hand, none of the other countries that the U.S. failed to build did.

b. Shared geopolitical interests of the intervening power and the targeted nation:

The intervening country would have a much higher rate of success if its interests meet the targeted nation's elites and the people interests. The commitment of the intervening power must be maintained by a significant strategic interest. In cases like Germany and Japan, the U.S. saw a necessity in containing the Soviet Union and communism, which presented the same interest of the targeted nations. In contrast; nation-building becomes impossible if the local population believe that the occupying foreign power is only advancing its own interests or the elites interests for that matter. That explains the disappointing American record in nation-building.

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[1]. Ibid, pp.5
[2]. Dobbins, et al (2003), pp.166

It was considered illegitimate by the people whenever the U.S. allied with the unpleasant local elites, especially in Latin America and Southeast Asia, and now in Iraq.[1]

c. Commitment of all parties involved to economic development in target nations:

Enormous economic resources are required in any nation-building operation. The Marshall Plan in Germany was one of the main reasons of success there. In Japan, the economic recovery was possible through the substantial American aid, as part of the efforts to fight the Korean War. In addition, both countries were highly educated and developed to utilize the aid to re-build their economies. In contrast, countries like Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and South Vietnam had no innovative capacity to utilize the American aid given. However, in many occasions, the U.S. was taking advantage of the targeted countries economically through facilitating deals for American corporations[2], as the case now in Iraq.

d. Security:

Nothing can be achieved if the nation is not secure. People must feel safe to go out and conduct their lives. The higher the proportion of troops relative to the resident population, the lower the number of casualties suffered and inflicted. Indeed, "most of the post-conflict operations that were generously manned suffered no casualties at all."[3] Without security, there is absolutely no hope, and no commitment to a

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[1]. Pei, M. and Kasper, S., **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace** (2003), pp. 5
[2]. Ibid, pp. 6
[3]. Ibid,.pp. 165

common future. Therefore, the security-sector reform should be the centre of any postconflict development planning.[1]

e. Level of effort:

As the saying goes, "Roma was not built in a day." The same is true for democracy. The Rand report gives five years as the minimum amount of time for successful nation-building. It particularly stresses the importance of great effort. It states: "Many factors--such as prior democratic experience, level of economic development, and social homogeneity--can influence the ease or difficulty of nation-building, but the single most important controllable determinant seems to be the level of effort, as measured in troops, money, and time."[2]

Failures in Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua missions produced vicious dictatorships - however, friendly to Washington. These societies are still stuck in misrule and vast poverty. In Cambodia; a genocidal regime gained power, and committed the worst crimes of humanity in history after the U.S. departure. In Vietnam however; a communist regime was installed which enforced millions to escape their home land.

12 out of 16 cases were taken unilaterally; Haiti and Afghanistan were authorized by the UN, which grant them legitimacy and helpful allies. Notwithstanding, the correlation between the American unilateralism and the governing strategy after the military intervention; 7 countries have been classified as cases of temporary rule by the U.S. – supported Surrogate regimes. These surrogate regimes were installed in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Panama, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and now in Iraq. Surrogate regimes' survival is characterized by its total dependency on the U.S. military support and headed by individuals chosen by the U.S. However, the use of interim

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[1]. Junne and Verkoren, (2005), pp. 19
[2]. Dobbins, et al, (2003), pp. 165

surrogate regimes in nation-building has proved its total failure, where none of these countries achieved democracy ten years after the U.S. departure.[1] The reason behind that is that the U.S. by building these interim regimes has empowered the military that is a key state institution, as strong political power, where leaders repress to maintain power. Surrogate regimes lack local legitimacy as whole. [2]

Installing the administration in the targeted countries has proven uneven. Direct American rule was imposed in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Japan. Multilateral administration in Germany, while in Panama, Grenada and Haiti, it was given to political leaders who have legitimacy and has been elected prior conflict erupted. However, direct American administration worked only in Japan, but not in Cuba neither the Dominican Republic. In Panama and Grenada, handing power to local leaders proved successful, but it did not in Haiti; reason for that would be due to the fact that the first two countries are small in size and population, unlike Haiti or Iraq.

There are failures and successes when the United States acted alone, or with other countries in nation-building efforts. So this factor alone is not decisive.[3] Multilateralism can make decision-making more difficult. But it has several advantages. It can be far less expensive, because other nations also bear the costs. It can also confer greater legitimacy to the U.S. military intervention. However, it is very important to get the support of neighbouring countries in the nation-building effort. "It is exceptionally difficult to put together a fragmented nation if its neighbours are trying to pull it apart."[4]

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1. Ibid, pp. 3
2. Ibid, pp. 3
3. Ibid, pp. 4
4. Dobbins, et al, (2003), pp.166

Section D:

1-   Lessons learned from the German Nation-Building Efforts:

a.   Military force and political capital can, in some circumstances, be successfully employed to strengthen democratic and societal transformation that can be permanent.

b.   Democracy can be transferred, and some societies can be encouraged to change.

c.   Defeated nations can be sometimes more cooperative than expected.

d.   Imposed accountability for previous injustices through war crimes tribunals for instance, can ease transformation.

e.   Defeated countries usually need extensive transfers to cover basic government expenditure and quickly provide humanitarian assistance after the conflict.

f.   The economy must recover before compensating the victims of the conflict, otherwise reparations will be counterproductive.

g.   Multilateralism in determining economic policies can delay economic recovery.

2- **Lessons to be learned from the Japanese Nation-Building Efforts:**

a. Democracy can be transferred to non-Western societies.

b. Unilateral nation-Building efforts can be easier than the multilateral ones.

c. Co-opting existing institutions can facilitate nation-building better than building new ones from scratch.

d. What can affect internal political dynamics and external relations for years to come is how the responsibility for the war is allocated.

e. The economic recovery can be facilitated by concentrating the power and economic policy decisions in the hands of a single authority.

f. Handing over the implementation of economic policy decisions to the local governing elite, with their own priorities, can seriously weaken the effectiveness of changes.

g. Idealistic reforms designed for the long- term improvement of the recipient nation must sometimes give way to the immediate, global concerns of the occupying power.[1]

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[1]. Ibid, pp. 51

3- The Successes in Comparison with Nation-Building in Iraq;

By far, the post-war Iraq has been the most challenging for multiple reasons;

a. Iraq's population is 27 million,[1] characterized by deep ethnic and religious divisions, unlike Germany and Japan. The different factions in Iraq, with the neighboring countries, are making it impossible for the U.S. to achieve security or gain momentum. However, they all share one goal only; ending the American occupation by force.

b. Germany and Japan's interests aligned with the U.S. strategic interests; however in Iraq the case is different. Washington's agenda is still under deep distrust, and interests will never meet except maybe with some distrusted elites there.

c. Iraq's state capacity is nothing to compare to Germany and Japan before the war. Saddam's dictatorship and years of sanctions left Iraq with very poor capacity to rebuild. Note withstanding the American practices during the war in destroying Iraq's infrastructure diminished any capacity Iraq possessed prior to the war in 2003.

d. Security is an absolute prerequisite in any nation-building attempt. However, security has proved impossible to achieve by the U.S. peacebuilders.

e. Finally, the level of effort in terms of time, money and troops was quiet high in both cases, as well as the current efforts in Iraq. However, the Iraqi operation is failing for all the above mentioned reasons -that will be viewed in chapter four-, the thing that will change scholars' hypotheses about the level of effort being the most important controllable factor for success in nation-building.

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[1]. Herd, Graeme p. (2005), Weak Authoritarianism and Iraqi State Building. Conflict Studies Research Centre, Middle East series 05/57. Published by; Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Watchfield, Swindon-England, pp.4

Chapter Four

Reasons behind the War Decision

The Bush Doctrine argued that, after September 11 attacks, America would have to launch periodic preventive wars to defend itself against rogue states and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction; that it would do this alone, if necessary.

In his speech before the UN General Assembly, two months after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush made the case for war beyond Afghanistan, into Iraq, and against all states that harbor terrorists. Four years later, and in his September 2005 speech at the very same place, the President assured his listeners that "all of us will live in a safer world" if the U.S. stays the course in Iraq and completes the war efforts. President Bush devotes the bulk of his addresses to two main topics; the war on terror, including the war on Iraq, and the expansion of free trade, offering, as usual, these two policies, war and free trade, as combined solutions to nearly all the world's problems. He describes the benefits of the war and his administration's commitment to it by promising his audience that "all of us will live in a safer world" if they complete the U.S mission in Iraq.

As for free trade, Bush explains that the U.S. would defeat terrorism by fighting poverty, and expanding trade… "By expanding trade, we spread hope and opportunity to the corners of the world, and we strike a blow against the terrorists…. Our Agenda for freer trade is part of our agenda for a freer world."[1]

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[1]. Juhasz, Antonia (2006), **The Bush Agenda, Invading the World, One Economy at a Time**. Gerald Duckworth publications, London. pp. 3

Nevertheless, the real reasons behind the war can be categorized as the following:

1. The Neo-conservatives Think Tank

Decades of writing, advocating and humanizing for the main economic and military principles has reached its most aggressive implementation under the Neo-conservative administration of George W. Bush. Neo-conservatives believe in the big-stick diplomacy, that there has never been before a state as powerful in its military as the US today that they can reshape the world according to their sole interests, and this can be done, unilaterally. They also believe that international politics operates according to the "bandwagoning" logic; the world will fear challenging the United States, the thing that will lead them all to throw up their hands and jump on the American bandwagon. Realists, on the other hand, warned the neo-realists that if the US threatened Iran and North Korea by putting them on the "Axis of evil" list, they will acquire nuclear weapons more vigorously.[1] However, Neo-conservatives believe that Iran and North Korea will respond to the fall of Saddam, and surrender to the U.S. demands.

After 9/11 the neo-conservatives argued that the root of the problem is the absence of democracy in the Middle East to combat terrorism. The Bush Doctrine insists on spreading democracy in the Middle East, Iraq would be the first major effort, and the rest will follow. The irony is that neither the neo-conservatives nor President Bush ever explained how democracy is going to be rooted in the Middle East, with no history of democracy in the region whatsoever.[2]

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[1]. Mearsheimer, John (2005), Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: Realism Versus Neo-Conservatism, Open Democracy. Http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-americanpower/morganthau 5/13/2006 pp. 3
[2]. Ibid, pp. 6

Realists thought that it would be foolish in the age of nationalism for the Americans to invade and occupy Iraq, altering their political system and turn them into pro-American nation. Morgenthau, who is one of the leading realist thinkers, rejected the belief during the Vietnam war that the fight was between communism and democracy, and believed that nationalism was the thing motivating Vietnamese and the guerrilla forces in South Vietnam, not communism. The same logic could be applied to Iraq. [1]

2. The Oil Factor and the Dollar

In 2000 elections, the oil and gas industry donated over 13 times more money to the Bush/Cheney campaign than to its challenger, while in 2004, the industry donated more than 9 times more to Bush/Cheney. For the first time in history it happens that the president, vice president, and the secretary of state are all ex- energy company executives.[2] As a matter of fact, Bush the father was the only other U.S. president to come from the oil and gas industry.

The key pillars of the Bush Doctrine are; war, imperialism, and corporate globalization. The Doctrine is the work of America's most tough politicians and allies of the Bush Administration over decades, dating back to "Bush the father" administration. The Doctrine's leading thinkers include those who served the Administration of both father and son, namely; Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Zalmay Khalilzad, Robert Zoellick, and scooter Libby, and others who only served this current administration including Eric Edelman, Doughlas Feith, Richard Perle, and Condoleezza Rice. Noticeably, many of those thinkers are either former executives from the energy sector or current executives at the world's most powerful corporations

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[1] Ibid, pp. 9

[2]. Juhasz , Antonia (2006), pp. 6

supporting the Doctrine including; Bechtel, Cheveron, Halliburton, and Lockheed Martin.[1]

Advocating the War on Iraq became the Neoconservatives only hope to prevent further OPEC drive towards switching its international transactions from a dollar standard to a euro standard, especially the euro as an oil transaction currency standard. In November 2000, Iraq made this switch when the euro was worth 80 cents. In 2002, the dollar declined 15% against the euro. Subsequently, in order to pre-empt OPEC, they need to increase their geo-strategic control of Iraq especially that Iraq is the 2nd largest proven oil reserves. [2]

One of the main objectives when setting the euro was to turn it into a reserve currency to challenge the U.S currency. [3] However, countries switching to euro reserves from dollar would be disastrous for the U.S. especially that everything that can be bought for dollars can also be bought for euros- except, for oil. The consequences would be massive; it would bring down the value of the U.S. currency, imports will cost Americans a lot more, consequently, reducing American living standards and serious inflation would result from countries and businesses altering their dollar assets into euro assets.

However, the real major obstacle to this happening is the oil. Since oil is the most important product traded internationally, countries must have dollars to buy it, and as long as this is the case, there is no point of countries keeping euros as reserve currency

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[1]. Ibid, pp. 310
[2]. Clark, w. (2003), The Real but Unspoken Reason for Iraq War, Washington, DC Independent Media Center: http//dc.indymedia.org. 10.23.2007
[3]. Nunan, Coilin (2003), Oil, Currency, and the War on Iraqb, pp.1. www.feasta.org/documents/oil 1.htm.

when they need dollars for oil, which makes the U.S. partly in control of the whole oil market. Changing the oil currency would mean the end of the American economic dominance. The OPEC economic argument changing to the euro was strong for a while because the Euro-zone is not highly in debt as the U.S., does not run an enormous trade deficit, and the interest rates in the Euro-zone are by far higher. Moreover, the Euro-zone has a larger share than the U.S. of world trade and it is the Middle East's main trading partner.

All this explains the American behaviour of turning to <u>military force</u> as its second tool for world dominance. The US has invaded Iraq, spread its rule, and announced that payments for oil would be in dollars only. However, oil exporters are increasingly and openly talking about selling their commodities for euros instead of dollars. Indonesia and Malaysia have been considering it, the thing that led the European Union's Energy Commissioner, Loyola de Palacio, to comment that she could see the euro replacing the dollar as the main currency for oil pricing. Iran on the other hand, has been showing interest in switching to euro: it has been issuing Eurobonds, switching its foreign exchange reserves from dollars to euros and has been having trade negotiations with the EU. As a matter of fact, a recent report shows that Iran has started selling its oil to Europe for euros and support Asian customers to pay in euros.[1]

The U.S. behaviour can be understood through the Neo-Conservatives perspective in international relations, as it is evident from the U.S. economic conditions before the war, when it showed recession, collapsing economy, falling of the stock market 5 weeks straight especially on the technology-heavy NASDAQ index, and higher level of

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[1]. Ibid, pp.1

unemployment. However, and after the war, all these disastrous economic conditions disappeared.[1] The best way to distract the public from all this- historically proven- was to start a war," War on Terror", on any one and everybody who wasn't "with us" as President Bush declared, and his determination on attacking Iraq.[2]

Within the Doctrine, "freer trade for freer world", its no surprise that it refers to the specific economic policies designed especially for all key U.S. multinational corporations who have been used as the actual weapons of war on terrorism and in the administration's fight to spread its vision of a freer and safer world. The Bush Agenda is with no doubt one of an ever-expanding American empire pushed forward by the unlimited power of America's largest multinational corporations and unmatched military. In 2003, the earnings of the 29 major oil and gas firms in the U.S. were $43 billion in profits and $68 billion in 2004.

Hence, in 2006 the profits were so high that only the three top companies of (Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips) earnings were nearly $64 billion between them, more than half went to Texas-based Exxon-Mobil, which recorded the single most profitable year of any corporation in world history in both 2004 and 2005.[3]

Halliburton and Chevron are key allies to the Bush Agenda. Their former officials were the vice president and secretary of state. On the other hand, the Bechtel Corporation succeeded in influencing and pushing for the Bush agenda through its former and

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[1]. Hayajneh, Adnan,(2000), Arab-American Relations Towards a Bright Future Edited by Dr. Sami A. Khasawnih, University of Jordan, pp. 303.

[2]. Peterson, John , US Imperialism and the War on Iraq- Mozilla Firefox at: file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/randan/My%20Documents/US%20Imperialism%20and%20the%20War%20on%20Iraq.htm

[3]. "ExxonMobil Profits Exceed $25 billion", BBC News- World Edition, January 31, 2005

current executives including current board member and former company president, George Shultz, Ronald Reagan's secretary of state. Bechtel Corporation is the largest engineering company in the world, with extensive work in the oil and gas fields.

Not less than sixteen current and former company officials of Lockheed Martin; the world's largest arms exporter and the U.S. largest military contractor, have held positions within the Bush administration.

Each of these companies has long history in Iraq, and all advocated the war against Iraq in 2003. Indeed, the war was very rewarding for each of these companies; Chevron the year 2004 was the most profitable in its 125 year history. Chevron earned in that year $13.3 billion, almost double the profit from the year before; while in 2005 the earnings of the company were more than $14 billion in profits.[1]

Bechtel's profits increased from $11.6 billion in 2002 to $16.3 billion in 2003, to $17.4 billion in 2004. Lockheed Martin's stocks more than tripled from early 2000 to January 2006, while Halliburton's stocks price went up almost four folds in value from March 2003 to January 2006. It would be worth to just notice that vice president Cheney is a stock holder in both Halliburton and Lockheed.[2]

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[1]. Juhasz , Antonia (2006), pp. 6-7
[2]. Ibid, pp. 6-7

3. The Pronounced Reasons

"Regime change" has been officially Washington's policy towards Iraq, justified as a pre-emptive war against the rogue state that possesses weapons of mass destruction (WMD), through a U.S. invasion or a military coup. However, the U.S. administration recognized that the war might actually lead to proliferation of WMD and terror. Nevertheless, risks were considered insignificant compared to the gains behind the control over Iraq.[1]

The above mentioned reasons for the war are not the only U.S. interests in the Middle East. The U.S. sees the whole region as part of its strategy of world dominance. Installing a pro- American regime in Iraq would leave Iran surrounded by the American military bases; from the west Turkey and Iraq, the North Central Asia, the south Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, and from the East Pakistan and Afghanistan. Achieving this would facilitate the protection of the U.S. planned oil pipes extended from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea.[2] Although the U.S. already has thousands of troops based in ten countries around the Middle East, this would give the U.S. a much stronger base, ensure the Israeli expansion and its access to oil, and limit the rising economic power of China with Japan and Europe by enforcing the U.S. dominance over the Middle Eastern oil.

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[1] Chomsky, Noam (2003), **Hegemony Or Survival; America's Quest for Global Dominance,** published by Penguin Books, London-England. P. 121
[2]. Iraq War and Imperialism, Monthly Review, September 29, 2002 at http://www.monthlyreview.org/1202editor.htm. 23/10.2007 pp. 10

On a global scale, controlling the oil through military force would be translated into a greater economic, political, and military power. [1]

In all previous cases, Washington had always been lenient, and happy to transfer responsibility and costs to other countries in any post conflict operation, however, in Iraq it has insisted to run the show alone. "Iraq is not East Timor, Kosovo, or Afghanistan," Condoleezza Rice contended, but did not mention the difference, maybe because it is too transparent; Iraq is the big prize, the others however, are just viewed as basket cases.[2] Therefore, Washington is in charge, not the Iraqi people or the UN.

The reasons behind the war explain the American failure in its efforts to nation- build Iraq. The U.S. administration has been matching means to the ends since the invasion. Nation-building Iraq is not the desired American outcome of the war; however, controlling Iraq's natural resources is, irrelevant of how, what or who rules Iraq, as long as American interests are secured.

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[1]. Ibid, pp.10
[2]. Chomsky, Noam (2003), pp. 142

Chapter Five

Iraq Realities after the occupation

March 2003, witnessed the invasion of Iraq by a U.S. - led force with the precise aim of overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein, and disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The approach was deconstructive, hoping to rebuild Iraq after discrediting the Baath regime, and destroying the only mechanism holding Iraq's mutually hostile entities together.[1]

The aim was to promote reform and, hence, security in the wider Middle East. Under UNSCR 1441, the U.S. and the British government claimed authority for the operation, after failing to secure support from the French, Russian, Chinese, German, and the Turkish governments. Diplomatic support was provided by a number of U.S. allies, particularly the United Kingdom, Spain, Japan, and Australia. In the mean time, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, expressed their behind-the-scenes support if the U.S. government decided to "finish the job", and remained cautious with their public statements. [2]

After long negotiations with the U.S., Turkey eventually permitted U.S. over flights, and the re-supply of U.S. ground forces in northern Iraq, as well as France and Germany. Turkey however, prohibited the U.S. and British ground troops to use its territory to invade Iraq.

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[1]. Bodansky, Yossef (2004), **The Secret History of the Iraq War**, Regan Books an imprint of Harper Collins Publishers, New-york. pp. 242
[2]. Ibid, pp. 243

The U.S. administration decided to retain control of both military operations and postconflict planning, after the impasse at the UN, and opposition from their main allies. The U.S. didn't see a big role for the UN or for any, except for limited number of allies to engage in reconstruction or political transformation post the war.

The U.S. forces were stationed in Iraq after the war, undertaking both pacification and constabulary duties. The limited number of allies the "coalition of the willing" provided military assistance, operating under a U.S. military command. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had transitional responsibility for immediate reconstruction of the civil administration, and establishing an Iraqi transitional authority. However, the CPA made the job harder than it was, and their performance was nothing to applaud to.[1] The UN role would be limited in advising on the political transformation, and their main efforts will be on providing humanitarian and technical services through UN agencies.[2]

Section A: Politically

The British in the 1920's after World War I, left Iraq with no tradition of pluralist democracy, instead, they left behind an authoritarian rule where the settlement of disputes by force. The sense of national Iraqi identity did not prevail over communal forms of identity along ethnic, geographic, tribal, or religious boundaries. Moreover, the Kurds and Shiite, who have no experience of representation as communities in the national Iraqi politics, will have to engage now. In general, the vibrant Iraqi middle class that emerge in the middle of the 20th century who provided the basis for a civil society has been voided out by over a decade of sanctions and two decades of confusion

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[1]. International Crises Group (ICG) (2004), Middle East Report N. 30, **Reconstructing Iraq**, Amman, Baghdad, Brussels, pp.i
[2]. Dobbins, et al (2003), pp. 168

under Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.[1] On top of these historic political problems, banditry and organized crime are now deeply rooted and part of the Iraqi's daily life.

In May 2006, a government of national unity was created, with a democratically elected Council of Representatives, and a ratified constitution. However, the key players within the government are still acting according to their sectarian interests, and not to Iraq's national interest, the thing that is weakening the central government especially that many ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively.

The Different Iraqi Factions' Perspectives:

Since the Iraqi leaders observe issues through a sectarian point of view, it is important to understand the different Iraqi leaders or factions' perspectives:

1. The Shiia:

The Shiia in Iraq are the majority of the population, counting 17 million, and constitute 60% of the population.[2] They have gained power for the first time in 1,300 years, and very interested in keeping that power.[3] However, from the wide shiia coalition, fractures emerged from within, known as the "United Iraqi Alliance". The different Shiia factions are struggling over power, ministries, regions, and Iraq as a whole. As a result, disagreements exist, especially over reaching a political agreement with the Sunni, and over the disarmament of the Shiite militias.[4]

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[1]. Ibid. pp.169

[2]. Herd, Graeme p. (2005), **Weak Authoritarianism and Iraqi State Building**. Conflict Studies Research Centre, Middle East series 05/57. Published by; Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Watchfield, Swindon-England. pp. 5

[3]. James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs (2006), **The Iraq Study Group Report**, Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc. New-York, pp.13

[4]. Ibid, pp 13

Nouri al-Maliki; the Iraqi Prime Minister is aware of the importance of security and national reconciliation in Iraq, yet tension exists between his government and the U.S. over many issues including; the U.S. timetable to achieve certain targets, requiring more control over Iraqi security forces, removal of the barricades around Sader City, and the resistance to move forwards towards reconciliation and the disarmament of the Shiite militias. However, the most powerful three Shiia bodies in Iraq are not in the government and against the U.S. presence in Iraq, including: Sader, Sistani, and Hakim.

Grand Ayotollah Ali-Sistani; although Sistani stays out of the daily politics, his influence has been the most powerful in Iraq, all the main Shiia leaders seek his approval and guidance because he is the leading Shiite cleric in Iraq. Sistani opposes the direct involvement of Shiia clergy in politic, he supports an Islamic republic, but not a theocracy as in Iran, and calls for a unified Shiia bloc with reasonable goals within a unified Iraq.[1] Nevertheless, his influence did not succeed in preventing intra-Shiia violence, and it is maybe fading already.

Moqtada Al-Sader; Many observers contended that Sader is following Hezbolla's model in Lebanon; who has an armed militia outside the government, the "Mahdi Army", and developing a political party within the government controlling basic services. Sader's followers are among the impoverished Shiia, especially in Baghdad. Although Sader has joined the Maliki's governing coalition, but clashes between his Mahdi Army and the Bader Brigades are on going, as well as with Iraqi, U.S. and U.K. forces. [2]

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[1]. Herd, Graeme p. (2005), pp. 5
[2]. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 15

Abdul Aziz Hakim; Hakim has close ties with Iran, and he is the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Badr Brigade, the most organized and largest Shiia political party. The (SCIRI) was trained by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to fight Saddam's Sunni dominated Baath Party. Hakim runs the local government in Basra, controlling the Interior Ministry, which directs the police, border guards and internal intelligence services.[1] Their objective is to create an independent Shiia region that includes nine provinces in the south.[2]

2. The Sunni

The 5 million Sunnis constitute around 20% of the population, living in central and western Iraq. the Sunnis consider themselves the inheritors of the Ottoman Empire.[3] After losing their power in Iraq, the Sunnis feel displaced, torn between gaining their position back through violence or political participation.[4] They are still heated about the U.S. decision to pursue the "de-Baathification" of the government and society, and in particular about the dissolving of the Iraqi security forces. The Sunnis believe that the process of the de-Baathification failed to distinguish between Baathists and Sunnis, just like the insurgencies in the Sunni triangle fails to distinguish between civilians and military targets. They are confronted with many contradictions; they are against the U.S. presence in Iraq yet they need their protection against Shiia militias; against being governed by a majority Shiia administration, but against a federation because an autonomous region would not be feasible for them. The Sunnis constitute a majority in 4 out of 18 provinces where 50% of them live. However 90% of the

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[1]. Herd., Graeme p. (2005), pp. 6
[2]. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 14
[3]. Herd, Graeme p. (2005), pp. 4
[4]. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp.15

insurgent attacks take place in –the so called Sunni triangle- the other 50% of the Sunnis live in mixed cities like Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk. [1]

The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called for the end of Sunnis' marginalization in government, and asked to expand their participation. The Sunnis were given the Vice Presidency; Ghazi Al Yawar, Speaker of the Parliament; Hajim Al Hassani who is a religious person who is not very appealing to secular Sunnis, and 6 of the 30 ministries, namely; the Defence Ministry.

President Talibani agreed to appoint Sunni Arabs to 15 seats on the constitution drafting. In response a committee requested to increase their representation on the 55-member Constitutional Committee. However the Sunnis did not support the Constitution, and considered it illegitimate, because federalism would break the country, and they would be deprived of Iraq's oil revenue.[2] Although the Sunni influence in the government is debatable, and their leadership of the insurgency is not clear, still two key figures among the Sunni have large support; Hashimi and Dhari.

Tariq Al-Hashimi; Hashimi is the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party which is the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in Parliament, and he is one of the two vice presidents of Iraq. His vision is against forming a federation, supports the distribution of oil revenues based on population, against the de-Baathification, and calls for the removal of the Shiite militia fighters from the Iraqi security forces, which killed three of his brothers.[3]

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[1]. Herd., Graeme p. (2005), pp. 4
[2]. Ibid, pp. 5
[3]. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 16

Sheik Harith Al-Dhari: Dhari is the head of the most influential Sunni organization in Iraq which is the "Muslim Scholars Association". He is against the U.S. occupation and against the Iraqi Government. His organization has ties with the Sunnis in the Iraqi Government and the Sunni Arab insurgency. Recently, a warranty for his arrest was issued for encouraging violence and terrorism, the thing that infuriated Sunnis across Iraq.[1]

3. Iraqi Kurds

The Kurds achieved a united front of two main political blocs; the "Patriotic Union of Kurdistan" (PUK), and the "Kurdistan Democratic Party" (KDP). They secured mainly the independent Kurdish region in the north, and succeeded in gaining an important role within the national government.[2]

Turkey, however, believe that "Iraqi Kurdistan was an integral part of Turkey until Churchill tore it away to create Iraq back in the early 20's".[3] It has always been adamant about preserving Turkey's hegemony over northern Iraq, regardless of any American-Kurdish deals. According to sources in Ankara; "in the days ahead, the number of Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq will reach 50,000 to 65,000." Their purpose would be to remove the threat posed by the Kurds and to consolidate Turkish hegemony over the areas claimed for Turkman, with full support from the U.S. administration, promising the Turks to never allow an independent Kurdistan. Notwithstanding, the U.S. promises to secure Kurdistan from any invasion, if the Kurds confront the Islamist terrorists, and help them win their war.[4]

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[1] Ibid, pp. 16
[2] Ibid. pp. 16
[3] Bodansky, Yossef (2004), pp. 122
[4] Ibid. pp. 247-248

Nevertheless, the Kurds in Iraq produced the core opposition group to Saddam. The Kurdish leaders are far more experienced, politically and administratively, than the returning Shiia exiles. They had de-facto independence for 14 years, with sanctions and no-fly zone. Most Kurdish areas are greatly stable, secular, and work like a separate country. However, they have three objectives after the fall of Saddam; Kirkuk as the capital of a self-governing province in a federal Iraq; having control over the profits gained from the province's oil fields; having Control and command over the 100,000 militias which they have refused to break up. Federal troops are not allowed on Kurdish soil.[1] Two main Kurdish leaders who has been behind the Kurdish independence and self – government movement:

Massoud Barazani; Barazani leads the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and he is the president of the Kurdish regional government. He cooperated with Jalal Talibani , his rival, for securing and empowering an independent Kurdish region in northern Iraq, where he raised the Kurdish flag in Kurdish controlled areas and lowered the Iraqi flags.[2] Barazani talks about peaceful coexistence, at the same time; argues that Article 58 of the draft Constitution states that Kirkuk status should be decided by referendum in Kirkuk. The Kurds gained more than 50% of the vote in Kirkuk, which creates a significant precondition for independence.[3]

Jalal Talibani; Talibani is the President of Iraq, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's leader. Talibani supports the independence of Kurdistan, and requires real power to his presidential office. He has not only secured power in Baghdad, but many significant PUK government ministries are loyal to him as well.[4]

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[1] Herd., Graeme p. (2005), pp. 6
[2] Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 17
[3] Herd., Graeme p. (2005), pp. 7
[4] Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp.17

Political Key Issues:

There are some critical key issues facing the Iraqi government and are agreed on by the Iraqi, American, and the international community, mainly; national reconciliation, security, and Governance.

1. National Reconciliation:

Soon after Prime Minister Maliki entered the office, he outlined a creditable program of national reconciliation. However, little action has been taken by the government on the main elements of national reconciliation notably; amending the de-Baathification, the issue that is keeping many Sunni Arabs from contributing in governance and society unless the constitution is amended; demobilizing militias; sharing Iraq's oil revenue; amending the constitution; resolve the future of Kirkuk; giving amnesty for those who have fought against the government.[1]

The core issue that should be tackled in the Iraqi constitution is federalism. The constitution basically created an independent Kurdistan region, allowing the establishment of other regions in the future, such as "Shi'astan" consisting nine southern provinces. Kurds, and many Shiia - especially supporters of Abdul Aziz Hakim- encourage this highly decentralized structure. However, the case is not the same for the Sunni Arabs, who reject this decentralized structure for many reasons, mainly: the Sunnis have no economically feasible region since all the energy resources in Iraq are concentrated in the Kurdish and Shiia regions, moreover, Sunni Arabs are mostly Iraqi nationalists who believe they should rule the country.

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[1]. Ibid, pp. 18

The future of Kirkuk is another unresolved key issue; an extremely oil-rich city in northern Iraq, with a significant number of Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen living there. The Kurds require a popular referendum for Kirkuk to join the Kurdish administered region, but the Turkmen and Arabs oppose this outcome under any circumstance, and the risks for more violence is expected over the Kirkuk referendum.

Leaders in Iraq claim that they are against the division of Iraq, however, the signs of commitment to national reconciliation among key Shiiaa and Kurdish leaders are little.[1]

On the other hand, errors of the Allied Forces are many; the failure of the U.S. intelligence and the ad hoc decisions and implementations did not help the situation directly after the invasion, and are crucial to the current situation as well, such as:

1- The destruction of the Iraqi Armed Forces , Police, administration, health and education systems, and the expulsion of more than 2 million Iraqis out of their jobs under the "de-Baathification" policy.

2- Allowing the Iranian Revolutionary Guards presence in Iraq, in great numbers.

3- Allowing extremist forces like the "Bader Brigades" which is managed and funded by the "Iranian Revolutionary Guards" to exist in the centre of the Iraqi coalition, organized by the U.S. to take power after Saddam Hussein.

4- Allowing the formation of the armed militias including thousands and thousands of armed men, who are the primary cause for the mass murders and terrorism in Iraq until now. [2]

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[1]. Ibid, pp. 18

[2]. **First Draft Report of the Mission to Iraq, 2-10 January 2007**, members of the mission include: Abdulla Aljubori- former governor of the Diyala Province in Iraq-, Andre Brie and Paolo Casaca- both members of the European Parliament- and Tomas Dentinho- Azores University. pp. 5

However, the long-term impact of Saddam's capture and the public humiliation was not the removal of Saddam's Baathism from Iraqi society, but rather the irreversible observation of the Iraqi people that they have no option but to embark on a fateful liberating jihad if they want to realize their clear destiny. The reconciliation between Shiite imam of Baghdad, Sayed Ammar al-Husseini, and the Sunni imam of Baghdad, Sheikh Ahmad Hassan al-Samharay was conducted by a joint Friday prayer at the Sunni Grand Mosque of Baghdad on December 12, 2003, a day before the capture of Saddam. An unprecedented event designed to highlight the importance of the religious leadership, deepening the anti-American struggle. Both imams after the prayers provoked their followers to unite against the Americans, forbidding them to work with the Americans and the Jews. The Islamists reacted quickly to Saddam's arrest. al-Qaeda leadership issued a communiqué " Daleel Al-Muojahed" reacting to the arrest wrote: " Saddam is down and al-Qaeda is moving up." "After the capture of the dictator Saddam Hussein, al-Qaeda will now show the Americans who is behind all the attacks. Saddam was a Baath, killed a lot of his people and a lot of Muslims, and this is what God was planning for him and this is the end of every Killer and dictator." It was then concluded with an explicit threat: " the message we send to the Americans and to Bush and Blair is don't be very happy, we promise you that both of you will cry tears very soon, and then, just then, you will know who al-Qaeda really is." The impact of Saddam's arrest on the anti-American jihad was examined through this context. Saddam's removal served the expansion of the resistance since Baathism can not compete with the Islamists, and various ethnic and nationalist groups felt free to join the anti-American jihad after assurance that Saddam will never return to power.[1]

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[1] . Bodansky (2004), pp. 478

The chief editor of the London Al-Quds al-Arabi, Abdul-Bari Atwan wrote on December 15, 2003, in a front page editorial: "The Iraqi resistance has become a culture as well as a creed and strategy. It has become contiguous with the Iraqis' dignity and honour and it definitely will not disappear with Saddam Hussein's capture, for Iraq has always remained larger than the leaders and a bloody bone in the throat of invaders and their allies." Then he concluded: "the future of Iraq will not be built by those who arrived abroad the American tanks but by those who have remained committed to their true Arab and Islamic identity and refused to be tools in the hands of the U.S.-Israeli occupation of their country. These will definitely appear soon to lead the new Iraq and bring to account all those who have conspired against it and collaborated with its enemies." And the coming escalation in the jihad would achieve this outcome, he predicted.

The unstoppable collapse of the Iraqi economy, unemployment, the deep disappointment with the U.S. dominated political process drove most Iraqis into the radical Islam, militant nationalism, and armed jihad.

However, ethnic identities are not a fixed given. [1] The war in Iraq produced a different sectarian point of view, based on ethnicity that can actually change over time, and sometimes quite quickly. This shift offers hope for the future of Iraq. The challenges lie in providing attractive perspectives for young adults, who centred their identities on ethnicity, due to the war and the lack of professional identities.[2] Therefore, without national conciliation, security, and development the country will sink more into chaos, divisions, civil wars, destruction, without any development for generations to come.

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[1]. Junne and Verkoren (2005), pp.316
[2]. Ibid, pp. 316

2. Security:

Since the 1950's, revolutions and coups in Iraq have been the bloodiest among all its neighbouring countries.[1] However, Iraq's ethno-religious diversity was never an issue, and never led to sectarianism or civil war. What is Iraq going through now is because of it must be an outcome of an organized plan, and a hard one to oust.

The increase of violence is fed by Shiite militias and death squads mostly supported and financed by Iran, a Sunni Arab insurgency, al Qaeda with associated jihadist groups, and wide spread organized criminality. The insurgency is a network of networks, there is no single leadership. In short, sectarian conflict is the principal challenge to stability.[2]

Although the insurgents have different goals but nearly all oppose the U.S. presence in Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq is run by Iraqis, mostly Sunni Arabs, while foreign fighters support in suicide operations. Al-Qaeda acts include; attacks on significant religious or political targets, suicide attacks, and large truck bombings. Their aim is to bring about a larger sectarian war between the Sunni and Shiia in Iraq, and force the U.S. out. On the other hand, the Shiia militias are posing a great threat to security in Iraq, especially that they are engaged in sectarian violence. However, these militias are fragmented, parts of them are associated with Iran and the government, parts are localized, and another part that is completely outside the law. They not only undermine the authority of the government and the security forces, but fight against any peaceful participation of the Sunni in the government as well. They target Sunni civilians, government ministries, and clash with one another over power.

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[1]. Tripp, Charles (2001), **A History of Iraq**, 2nd ed., Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp.7
[2]. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp 3

Moqtada al-Sadr fighters- or the Mahdi Army- are about 60,000 fighters, who are fighting against the U.S. and the Iraqi government forces, the Sunni Arab civilians, and guard certain Shiia closed societies in northeast Baghdad's known as "Sader City" with 2.5 million inhabitants. The Mahdi Army is growing in both size and influence that part of them has moved afar from Sader's rule.

The Badr Brigade, who are associated with the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), and have old ties with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, led by Abdul al-Hakim where some members became integrated into the Iraqi police, and some are policing in southern Iraqi cities, targeting Sunni civilians and clashing with the Mahdi Army in southern Iraq while wearing the security services uniform. [1] Iraq has become a commonplace for murder, kidnapping and robberies. Organized crimes are highly concentrated in unstable areas such as Anbar province. Some other criminal gangs cooperate or claim to be part of the Shiia militia or the Sunni insurgency just to gain legitimacy.

There are eighteen provinces in Iraq, four of them are highly insecure; Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. Around 40% of Iraq's population are in these provinces. In Baghdad, the violence is mainly between the Sunni and Shiia, while the Sunni insurgency and al-Qaeda are taking momentum in Anbar. In Kirkuk the violence is between the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basra and the south the violence is mainly between the Shiia themselves, struggling for power.

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[1]. Ibid, pp. 6

The three provinces of the Kurdish north and parts of the Shiia south are the most stable, although this stability is guaranteed through tough policing measures.[1] Most cities in Iraq have a sectarian mix and are overwhelmed by continual violence. Sunni politicians want the U.S. to take action on the militias, and the Shiia politicians are asking for ending the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda, and none is willing to abandon their arms until the other party is disarmed and destroyed.[2]

There is no doubt that the militias are now driving the political force. The Shiia political leaders are still distinguishing between the Sunni insurgency, whose target is to over throw the government, and the Shiia militias who fight Sunnis, empower the government, and secure neighbourhoods. The problem with the militias is that they are being faced with little action to limit their influence from the government and Prime Minister Maliki, who owes his office to Sader in large. On the other hand, the Sunni Arabs are still hesitant to abandon violence for the political process especially that Sunni politicians in the government have little support among their own population, and assassinations against family members of those in the government are committed often, and too often they tend to cooperate with al Qaeda against the U.S. and Shiia forces. However, in Anbar province the tribal Sunni leaders agreed recently to pursue al Qaeda and foreign fighters, and are already taking action.

The message that can be sent from the prevalence of the militias in Iraq means one thing; that political leaders can maintain their positions in the government and enhance their power, only if supported by armed forces.[3]

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[1]. First Draft Report of the Mission to Iraq, 2-10 January 2007, pp.5
[2]. Baker-Hamilton Report (2006), pp.20
[3]. Ibid, pp.5

The conclusion is that there are too many armed groups in Iraq, and very little hope for agreement or lying arms down. Sectarian violence is the prime cause for civilian casualties. The violence is shaking the confidence of the government, displacing Iraqis in areas where their sects are the majority, and vitalizes militias.

The Americans by the end of 2003 were able to destroy many Baathist force groupings and have captured many senior security officials and generals of Saddam Hussein regime. Strategically, the U.S. was fighting the old war in Iraq, and did not proactively and pre-emptively tackle the next phase of the momentous jihad for the control of Iraq and the entire Arab Muslim world. The U.S. was obsessed with destroying the 5,000 or so Baathist fighters and ignoring the greater jihadist forces who are around 20,000 to 50,000 soldiers and growing according to Arab and Islamist sources. The new jihadist forces are better trained and better disciplined than the old Baathists fighters, the thing that the U.S. intelligence failed to anticipate and prevent. Moreover, Washington failed to comprehend and address the profound transformation of the Iraqi people, and failed to normalize life in Iraq, which led to the anti-American intifada, and the growing popular support for the empowerment of the escalating guerrilla warfare. The jihadists were engrossed in a large scale recruitment and training program, in Iraq and throughout the Muslim world by the end of 2003. Volunteers are still flowing to Iraq with their experts and leaders, while the Bush administration was desperately trying to finish the job by July 1, 2004, the Islamist jihad were hardly starting. [1]

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[1] . Bodansky, Yossef (2004), pp. 490

The U.S. coalition and Iraqi Forces:

Facing this violence is the Multi-National Forces- Iraq under the U.S. command working with Iraq Security Forces (ISF). The Multi-National Forces- Iraq were authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1546 in 2004, the mandate was extended in November 2006 for one more year.

There are about 141,000 U.S. military personnel in Iraq, with approximately 16,500 military personnel from 27 coalition partners, the largest group of 7,200 are from the U.K. The U.S. Marine Corps are responsible for theAnbar province while the UK in the southeast, mainly in Basra. The U.S. largest embassy is being built in Baghdad with about 1000 U.S. government employees and about 5000 civilian contractors.

The U.S. military is rarely engaging in large-scale combat operations. Instead, efforts for counterinsurgencies focus on a strategy of "clear, hold, and build". Clearing areas from insurgents and death squads, holding the cleared areas with Iraqi security forces, and then build those areas. However, regular rotations for the U.S. army and marine units, which is one year for Army units and 7 months for Marine units, is complicating the U.S. military units to get familiar with the local scene, earn the trust of the population, and develop a sense of corporation. Moreover, the harsh conditions in Iraq are causing the equipment to wear out fast that many units are lacking fully functional equipments for training.

The American military has now few reserve force to deploy if ground forces are needed to respond to other world's crisis.

The so called U.S. military strategy in Iraq is the training of a capable ISF. The target for the end of 2006 was to train about 326,000 Iraqi security services, which includes

138,000 members of the Iraqi Army and 188,000 Iraqi police. The Iraqis have operational control over 1/3 of Iraqi Security Forces and the U.S. has the rest, while no U.S. forces are under Iraqi Command.[1]

The Iraqi Army:

The Iraqi Army is considered as one of the more professional Iraqi institutions; however, the performance has been uneven. There is a question about the Army's ethnic composition and the loyalty of some units and whether they are serving the national goal or the sectarian agenda? The army has 10 planned divisions, even numbered and serving in areas where they signed up to serve in, but they have been unwilling to be deployed to other areas of the country. Other challenges are facing the Iraqi Army mainly:

The lack of leadership, units lack equipments because the American congress has been hesitant to fully fund Iraqi forces, units lack personnel, and the lack logistics and support.

The Iraqi police:

The Iraqi Police Service is by far worse than the Army. Currently they are about 135,000 responsible for local policing. They have no training, no legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, and no firepower to fight organized crime, insurgents or militias. The Iraqi National Police is about 25,000 trained to counterinsurgency operations and not police work. The Border Enforcement Department numbers approximately 28,000.

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[1]. Barker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 8

The Iraqi police routinely engage in sectarian violence especially against the Sunni Arab civilians, and cannot control crime. The police is organized under the Ministry of Interior which is confront by corruption and militia infiltration and lack control over police in the provinces.[1] There is not a clear Iraqi or U.S. agreement on what the police mission is, nor does the U.S. authority know the composition and membership of the different police forces or the nature of their funds and equipment. There are numerous reports of the Iraqi police officers taking part in training to obtain weapons and uniform to use in sectarian violence.

Facility Protection Services:

There is an armed unit for every Iraqi ministry to guard the ministry's infrastructure. These units total around 145,000 uniformed Iraqis with arms. Their loyalties and capabilities are questionable, for instance; the ministries of Agriculture, health, and transportation are controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr supporting and funding the Mahdi Army. The Facilities Protection Service is dysfunctional and incompetent, as one U.S. senior official described them, while many Iraqis refer to them as militias.[2]

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[1] . Ibid, pp.10
[2] . Ibid,.pp. 11

3. Governance; Provision of basic Services and Fighting Corruption:

Basic services have not been provided to people by the government such as drinking water, education, electricity, sewage, and health care. Production in Iraq now is below pre-war levels as expected, however, its much worse in Baghdad and other unstable areas. Reasons for that are many, mainly; the provision of services by the government is sometimes on sectarian basis; insurgents targeting key infrastructure; corruption is uncontrolled costing Iraq $5-7 billion per year, and still none of the senior officials is convicted on corruption before the court of law; capacity is insufficient especially after the de- Baathification and the rise of violence that pushed a lot of skilled Iraqis out of the country. The estimation of the deported professionals after the de-Baathification campaign reached 2 million individuals who have no political agenda.[1] Although efforts are done to establish an Iraqi judiciary including a supreme court, with some availability of dedicated judges but the coercion against the Iraqi judiciary and their families has been brutal.[2]

Efforts by Prime Minister Maliki and his government to engage the different political and religious leaders in promoting national reconciliation, and efforts to reconcile demands within his governing coalition has been undermined and challenged especially by the withdrawal of key allies in his government. On March, 2007, the Fadhila Party withdrew from the United Iraqi Alliance which is the leading bloc in the National Unity Government. The Fadhila Party holds 15 parliamentary seats. On April 16, 2007, the Sadrist bloc within the Alliance withdrew its 6 ministers from the P.M.'s cabinet. On May 5th, the Sunni parliamentarians' bloc "Tawafoq" including Vice President al-Hashimi, showed his dissatisfaction with the Government in addressing their concerns,

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[1] . First Draft Report Of The Mission To Iraq, 2-10 January 2007, pp.2
[2] . Baker-Hamilton Report , (2006), pp. 21

www.manaraa.com

especially the constitutional review process, and threatened to withdraw from the Government. On the other hand, the Kurdish Alliance, also reportedly threatened to leave the government if the final status of Kirkuk was not resolved by the end of 2007. The Kurdish Alliance holds 53 seats in the council of representatives. [1]

Concerning the hydrocarbon law, it has been endorsed with its related annexes by the Council of Ministers, but a decision on whether the law will be voted on as part of a larger energy package with annexes and supporting laws or by itself, has not been reached yet . The four annexes supporting the law are: the allocation of oilfields, revenue sharing, the structure of the Ministry of Oil, and the establishment of the Iraq national oil company. Under this proposed law, the national oil company would have jurisdiction over Iraq's oilfields, and the authority to sign contracts. A federal oil and gas council will be established for setting all policies related to industry issues and contracts. A team of oil experts from both inside and outside Iraq would be advising the federal council before signing any contracts. However, many political groups objected certain provisions of the law.

Concerning the amendment of "de-Baathification", two competing drafts have been issued; one from the Presidency Council and the Office of the Prime Minister; and the other from the Chairman of the de-Baathification Commission, Ahmad Chalabi. Consequently, an intense political debate has sparked, and either draft has been ratified.

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[1] . Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004), S/2007/330, submitted to the Security Council of the United Nations, dated 5, June, 2007.

On the 13th of March, 2007, the Prime Minister marked his first visit to Ramadi, the majority Sunni province, to meet with provisional officials, security chiefs and tribal leaders of Anbar governorate. The conference of Anbar tribal sheikhs by the Anbar Salvation Front was held on the 15th of April called for cooperation with the multinational and Iraqi Forces, and fight al-Qaeda in Anbar province. [1]

Other contentious issues are facing the government such as; the constitutional review, Iraqi federalism, and the distribution of powers and wealth. However, and if some of these amendments were to agree to, the Iraqi Government could lead itself towards the basis for national government, and could play an important coordinating role within the decentralized federal system envisaged by Iraq's Constitution.

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[1]. First Draft Report Of The Mission To Iraq, 2-10 January 2007, pp.2

Section B: Economically

1. The Coalition Provisional Authority's Policies:

Iraq's economical problems are major. Institutions failed while insurgency gained momentum. Economic misfortune feeds on political and criminal violence, subsequently; popular dissatisfaction and unemployment invoking insurgencies and hamper development.[1] Most of the jobs available now in Iraq are related to violence causing the deteriorating security conditions there, and the escalation of revenge and insurgency.[2] However, Iraq has a good potential for growth because of its sufficient oil reserves, water resources, and fertile lands. But the economy has been severely shocked and became dysfunctional after decades of problems. During the 1970's Iraq had a police state economy, a war economy during the 1980's, and a sanctions economy during the 1990's.[3]

Currently, Baghdad's main shopping streets are filled with expensive consumer items that have never been available before. The current consumer-led growth in Iraq was partly the result of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)'s September 2003 decisions to firstly; increase the public sector's wages, secondly; apply anti-inflationary policies which helped in stabilising the Iraqi Dinar, and control the inflation at about 34% in 2003 and little below 30% in beginning 2004. However, relative price stability and consumption growth do not demonstrate the kind of reconstruction required for an economy that has been suffering for decades of mismanagement, war, sanctions, and wide spread looting. There are few real construction work done, except in oil and electricity. Meanwhile, factories are deserted and many industrial estates have turned

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[1]. (ICG), Reconstructing Iraq (2004), pp.1
[2]. First Draft Report Of The Mission To Iraq, 2-10 January 2007, pp.2
[3]. Baker- Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 22

into ruins. Moreover, damaged infrastructure, including roads and bridges has not been repaired.

The CPA performance in Iraq made the hard job harder. The occupation forces went to Iraq without a plan and a strategy with minimum Iraqi input-if not any- that was constantly subject to Washington's deadlines and faced with discontent by the Iraqis. Consequently, the CPA was shifting courses and taking ad-hoc decisions to avoid greater discontent. Hence, they tried to fix it by large-scale privatisation, which was unrealistic given the country's conditions. At risk were 190 state-owned companies employing around 650,000 employees, where none of these companies- except the oil related industries- were viable, and some were bankrupt due to low assets or to the looting that followed the Baathist fall. Privatization itself would have fed insecurity by the dismissal of thousands of workers increasing political unrest. As a result, the plan was faced with rejection from the Iraqis, and the CPA failed to develop an alternative approach that might have refreshed weak state companies and secure temporary jobs for the unemployed. [1]

However, the CPA did not want to abandon the strategy of privatization completely, so they leased contracts to end state monopoly control and started the "build-operate-and-transfer" plan. Some of these measures were carried out. The CPA froze the accounts of some state owned companies, and sold the inventory of those under the auspices of ministry of trade, to reload Iraq's budget. These actions led to severe liquidity shortage in many state-owned enterprises including those with potential to be back in business again.

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[1] . (ICG), Reconstructing Iraq, (2004), pp. 7

All that with the de-Baathification, deprived state companies of their most talented and able employees, managers and technicians, consequently, even big industries in Iraq (like the cement company) were unable to participate in the reconstruction process, and the high demand was met with large imports. That emphasis on privatization bred suspicion among Iraqis that the U.S. has a hidden agenda to control the country's resources especially the oil. [1]

Another pillar of the CPA's free-market, was allowing full foreign ownership and unrestricted foreign direct investment in all sectors, except for oil and land. The issue triggered local debate, some businessmen and professional workers considered the policy overdue, partly because foreign companies are hesitant to enter Iraq, while among others objections were strong. Legally (an occupying force has no right under international law to impose such radical changes).[2] The decision was dangerous to Iraq's capitalist class, and was just another indication of the U.S. plan to enhance its corporate interests, and preparations for U.S.-Israeli hegemony. Nevertheless, the timing was not right for foreign investments, due to the escalating violence in the country, and the absence of effective legal framework and trade policies.

Another major problem was the stalemate between the State Department and the Pentagon, causing delays in the expenditure of funds and constant staff changing at the expense of the know-how and experience. Finally, differences between the two departments were settled in favour of the Pentagon, who has less developmental expertise, leading to hostility between officials who they send to Iraq and the specialists already been there on the ground for some time. Later it became clear that the Program

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[1]. Ibid, pp. 7
[2]. Ibid, pp.8

national counterparts are essential in any post-conflict development efforts.[1] An advisor at the Iraqi planning ministry complained: "some of the best people with PhD's from all over the world are sitting at home doing nothing. No one thought of asking them for advice."[2]

An oil economist at Baghdad's Mustansariyya University claims that the CPA advisor to the oil ministry disregarded his proposal of sharing his research with them. Moreover, the Iraqis complain that the major bulk of reconstruction was awarded to foreign rather than local contractors; however, they try to subcontract as much as possible to local companies because of the importance of building Iraq's private sector, and to provide them logistical support.[3] Policies for strengthening the local private sector have to be dealt with more vigorously. Iraq should work on joint partnerships between foreign investors and local businesses.

The unemployment in Iraq is one of the prime reasons for insecurity and the spread of violence. "Unemployment is the main problem and main source of resentment. It's a vicious circle: Lack of security leads to lack of reconstruction and jobs availability, which leads us back to lack of security" [4] The majority of Muqtada al-Sadr followers come from the "labour classes", as Sadr's representative in Basra confirmed; " Resistance was fuelled by unemployment and by the occupiers' phoney contracts that are just ink on paper." "The British and the Americans just make false promises." "We

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[1]. USAID: Iraq in Perspective, an analysis of what does and does not work in a transitional, Local Governance Programming in the Post-Conflict Environment, May 2006. Prepared by International Resources Group (IRG), Washington, DC, pp. ii.
[2]. (ICG) interview (April 10, 2004), Baghdad.
[3]. (ICG) Reconstructing Iraq, (2004), pp. 13
[4]. Quoted from the ICG interview with Hajir Adnan, on the 6th of March 2004, Baghdad.

give money to the families of the martyrs of the Mahdi army and to the poor and sick."

He added.[1] The failure of creating jobs is just empowering the Islamist militant parties.

A year after Saddam's fall, complaints about corruption was everywhere, not only about the Baathist regime, but Iraq's new leaders and the occupation forces as well. In March 2004 survey, 58 % of respondents said that they had heard reports of corruption, and 32% were convinced that the CPA was involved in it.[2] Corruption usually increases in post-conflict situations, and prosper on construction and on projects that are in the hands of the public, because public institutions in this phase have little capacity to control expenditure and corruption. Iraqi businessmen are complaining that many ministry officials are proceeding 'business as usual basis, asking for presents and privileges. It's the same culture as under Saddam: Red tape, favouritism and connections "wasta" in Arabic. Nothing really has changed."[3] When the ICG interviewed Kurdish human rights activists and businessmen in Suleimaniyeh and Erbil back in May 2004, they complained that: "you have to pay everybody, left, right and centre. If you want a contract from authorities you need to bribe them. Most contracts are awarded to people related to politicians."

The CPA performance in not addressing Iraqi's immediate needs, working on irrelevant short term projects, U.S. bureaucratic infighting, inexperienced staff and high turnover just added to the obstacles, and made any development effort more challenging than they already are.

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[1]. (ICG) interview (June 2004), Basra
[2]. Al-Mashreq, 4 May 2004. from the ICG ,Reconstructing Iraq (2004), pp.21
[3]. (ICG) interview with Iraqi businessmen, Diyarbakir, 26 May 2004.

2. The Oil Sector:

Another complicating factor is Iraq's oil dependence.[1] Post 1974, the Baathist regime intelligently used the new found oil wealth to tie the population, on an individual basis to the state, for instance, from 1958 to 1977 the number of Iraqis employed by the state went up from 20,000 to more than 580,000 plus 430.000 Iraqis employed in the armed and security services, and in the aftermath of the 1990-91 Gulf War, the civilian arm of the state employed 21% of the working population, with 40% of Iraqi households depend on government payments. This dependence on the government was due to the reduction of trade unions, and the rationing system where the food is distributed through 53,000 neighbourhood grocery shops and regulated through a government-controlled ration card, with restrictions placed on these cards meant individuals must pick up their food every month within the same region. By that, the regime secured loyalty and domination over the population. The official institutions during the 1990s retreated from society under the pressure of sanctions, especially in the area of welfare and education, with the exception of the rationing system. However, the official institutions were replaced with the flexible, informal arms of the shadow state, which guaranteed Saddam Hussein's survival and rule throughout the 1990s.

Currently, 70% of Iraq's GDP and 95% of government revenues depends on oil production and sales. Iraq's production of oil is around 2.2 million barrels a day, a number that is less than pre-war production levels and below the Iraqi's government target of 2.5 million barrels a day.[2] Many problems face the oil production in Iraq, mainly; lack of security where insurgents are still targeting pipelines and oil facilities, lack of technical capacity and the need for metering system and professional

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[1]. (ICG) Reconstructing Iraq (2004), pp.22
[2]. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 23

maintenance at pumping stations, pipelines, and port facilities, and the lack of investments, where foreign companies are reluctant to invest in Iraq. The Iraqi oil experts are either intimidated or not approached at all to participate, or already have left the country after the war.

Corruption and steeling are costing the Iraqi government about 150,000 to 200,000 barrels per day. As one senior U.S. official told the Iraq Study Group (ICG) that corruption is more responsible than insurgents for breakdowns in the oil sector.[1] Article 108 of the Iraqi constitution states that: oil and gas are the ownership of all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates. And article 109 gave the federal government the tasks to manage the oil and gas extracted from current fields. However, this politics of oil is just undermining the Iraqi efforts to create a unified central government by opening the doors for regions to take the lead in developing new oil resources. Senior members of Iraq's oil industry complain that a national oil company could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues and reducing regional or local claims to a percentage of the revenue derived from production.[2] But regional leaders are sceptical and resist this proposal, especially the Kurdish and Shiia leaders who are already negotiating and signing contracts with foreign oil companies. However, development is severely hindered by decentralization since centralization is the key element of the reconstruction process.[3]

Proposals are floating to redistribute a portion of oil revenues directly to the population on a per capita basis. However, currently in Iraq there is no institution that could

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 24
[2]. Ibid. pp. 24
[3]. Talantino, Andrea Kathryn (2002), **Intervention as Nation-Building: Illusion or Possibility?**
Department of Political Science, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA, USA, Sage Publications, pp. 34

implement such a distribution system, a system that needs a long time to establish, and has to be based on a well developed state census and an efficient income tax system,[1] which Iraq lacks now.

The U.S. is investing greatly in this sector; on the other hand, Iran has signed import and export agreements with Iraq, and receives Iraqi crude to refine.[2]

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[1]. Hamilton-Baker Report (2006), pp. 32
[2]. Herd , Graeme p. (2005), pp. 7

Section C: Socially

The social conditions can not be better than the political or the economic conditions in Iraq. If we are to access the situation in Iraq by numbers, it might give us an idea about the social situation as follows:

Number of Iraqis in American prisons in Iraq: 24,500, and rising up to 50% since the President's surge plan began in February 2007. 85%of these prisoners are Sunni. While the number of juveniles, aged 11 to 17 is around 800, 85 % are also Sunnis. Number of Iraqis in exile in neighbouring lands " bus people" is 2.5 million, according to the UN high commissioner for refugees, which makes it the fastest growing – and already the third largest refugee population in the world. Also during the surge months, the number of internally displaced Iraqis was over 600.000, doubling the number of internal refugees to 1.14 million, according to the Red Crescent Society. However, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimation is 2.2 million. Also during the surge, 63% of Iraqis fled their neighbourhoods due to direct threats on their lives, according to the UN.[1] The estimation of the United-Nations of displaced Iraqis in Iraq is 1.6 million, and about 1.8 million fled the country.[2]

After a decade of destructive sanctions, international aid organizations and medical agencies cautioned that war in Iraq would just lead to a humanitarian cataclysm. 3 A meeting was held in Switzerland of 30 countries, before the war, preparing for what might happen. The U.S. did not attend. International aid agencies criticized the U.S. plans for humanitarian relief in post- war Iraq. UN officials protested that; "There is a

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[1]. Engelhardt, Tom (2007), "Iraq Progress: By the Numbers", Article/ posted September 10, 2007 (web only). Last entered 9/25/2007.
[2]. First Draft Report Of The Mission To Iraq, 2-10 January 2007, pp.2
[3]. Chomsky (2003), pp. 126

studied lack of interest in Washington in a warning call we are trying to deliver to the

people planning for the war, about what its consequences might be."[1]

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[1]. Ibid, pp. 126

Chapter Six

The US Agenda of Iraq and the Alternative Solutions Possible

The political process months following the fall of Baghdad, proved to be ill planned. In contrast to Afghanistan, the US administration acted alone, and resisted the sharing authority concept, especially with any Iraqi-grown transitional government. The US authorities had vague ideas about the process of transfer of authority to a new Iraqi Government, despite the urging demands from Iraqis, and State Department officials for board-based interim authority. However, the White House and the Defence Department fought the idea, and insisted that Ahmad Chalabi and other Iraqi exiles would make the transfer smoother.[1]

The Chaos after the occupation caused the arrival of Paul Bremer in May, 2003, as the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Realizing the need for a governing body that would include Iraqis, Bremer issued the 25 member Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in July, which not only favoured Iraqi exiles, but also disadvantaged the Sunnis, and lacked power.

After the IGC's inability to create a transitional government, the CPA decided on November 15, 2003 to end the occupation by June 30, 2004, and advocating a complicated process for choosing the Transitional National Authority by a group of people. However, Sistani, who is the most respected religious figure among the Shiia, demanded national elections, but was rejected by the US administration for many reasons mainly its fear from not being able to control the process, and fear from an

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[1]. Barnett, Michael (2006), pp. 104

outcome that would be inconsistent with the US interests. The UN representative Brahimi, believed that it would be impossible to hold fair elections under the circumstances, but encouraged strongly that the selection of the interim government has to be "as democratic and participatory as possible in order to give the government breadth, legitimacy, and popular support."[1] Thus, the US administration afraid to loose its hold on the political process, insisted on a limited interim government, including technocrats, or technical experts exercising managerial authority, selected by a complicated process using caucuses (which is a conference of party leaders to choose candidates or delegates) . Eventually, Brahimi convinced Sistani to delay elections, and the US to discard the caucuses in support of elections.

The US failure to establish an inclusive Iraqi interim authority did not only worsted the security situation, but also deepened the Iraqi suspicions concerning the US intentions in Iraq. The concept of deliberation was avoided, channels of communications between different Iraqi factions were weakened, and Iraqis did not have the chance to express their differences through non-violent means. Consequently the "Golden Hour" was overlooked for the establishment of an inclusive Iraqi advisory body.

As for the constitution of Iraq, the Iraqi Transitional Authoritative Law thought of a transparent and large participatory process for the constitution drafting in seven months time, with a provision of extending the process if needed. Throughout the process, more time was needed, when the US administration forcefully intervened in the negotiations, objected any extension, and held secret meetings. Consequently, this rushed process restricted participation, made it difficult to include Sunnis, and no public engagement was possible due to security conditions. The ICG contended: "Regrettably, the Bush

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[1]. Ibid. pp. 104

administration chose to sacrifice inclusiveness for the sake of an arbitrary deadline, apparently in hopes of preparing the ground for a significant military drawdown in 2006. As a result, the constitution- making process became a new stake in the political battle rather than an instrument to solve it."[1] The US impatience deprived the Iraqis the opportunity to learn about democracy and deliberation, and made them believe that the document was Washington creation. Ultimately, instead of providing Iraqis the opportunity to come together, the constitution process just kept them apart.

After presenting the best practices of nation-building, it seems clear that the U.S. practices in Iraq are nothing but a profound lesson on how to exploit weak countries, and sustain hegemony. Nation-Builders are suppose to be public trustees, and their power is suppose to be directed towards public's benefit, however, they are known too for using arbitrary power.

Section A: The White House Strategy on Iraq- "The New Way Forward":

"The New Way Forward" strategy calls on elevating the standards of the Iraqi security forces to independently secure the country, and reform the security ministries to end the sectarian bias and abuses. The U.S. President contended that the U.S. troops will step down as Iraqi forces take control, and large withdrawals will be decided by the U.S. military leaders on the ground. [2] This approach was defined by Ken Mehlman[3] as an "adapt to win" strategy, referring to the U.S. strategy on sending more troops, rotate more soldiers, and involve more actors like the UN and the European Union.

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[1]. International Crisis Group (ICG) 2005, **Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry,** Policy Briefing No. 19, (Amman / Brussels). pp.1
[2]. Beehner, Lionel (2006), 'Plan B' Scenario in Iraq, Copyright 2007 by the Council on Foreign Relations. pp.1
[3]. Ken Mehlman is the chairman of the Republican National Committee, found in Beehner (2006).

Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the Act) states that the President should submit to Congress an assessment of the status of each of the 18 Benchmarks contained in the Act dated January 10, 2007.

"These Benchmarks relate to Government of Iraq actions believed to be important to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, to improve the security of the Iraqi population, to provide essential services to the population, and to promote its economic well-being. These efforts complement other U.S. and Iraqi collaborative actions as part of the New Way Forward."[1] The New Way Forward recognizes that in order to achieve the common goals of a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend and sustain itself, and be an ally in the war on terror, both the U.S. and Iraqi governments must fulfil their commitments. [2]

President Bush announced the new strategy for Iraq; sending more than 20,000 additional U.S. troops to Baghdad and Anbar province, and increasing the responsibility for the Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces, with more economic and diplomatic initiative. He contended that "the most urgent priority in Iraq is to stop the violence, and create the stability needed for the country's new Government to succeed" and that the sectarian violence has overwhelmed political gains Iraqis have achieved and created "unacceptable" situation in Iraq.[3] He also contended that the Iraqi government has dedicated 18 Iraqi army and national police brigade to install across Baghdad's nine districts and work alongside with local police, and that he has dedicated five more U.S.

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[1]. U.S. Department of State, **Initial Benchmark Assessment Report on Iraq**, released by the White House Office of the Press Secretary, July 12, 2007, pp. 1
[2]. Ibid, pp. 1
[3]. Miles, Donna (2007), Bush Outlines New Strategy for Course ahead in Iraq,. American Forces Press Services, official website of the United States Air Force, Washington AFNEWS, 1.11.2007.

military brigades to Baghdad and 4,000 more troops in Anbar province, the most restless parts of Iraq. He noted that 80 percent of all violence in Iraq occurs within 30 miles of the capital city and that Anbar province has become al Qaeda's new base.

President Bush explained why earlier operations failed: "In earlier operations, Iraqi and American forces cleared many neighbourhoods of terrorists and insurgents, but when our forces moved on to other targets, the killers returned. This time, we will have the force levels we need to hold the areas that have been cleared." He also said that "This time, Iraqi and American forces will have a green light to enter these neighbourhoods, and Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki has pledged that political or sectarian interference will not be tolerated." Finally, President Bush said, "Only the Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and secure their people." But, he also said that the Iraqi government has an aggressive plan to accomplish that.

The President also made it clear to Prime Minister Maliki that the U.S. commitment is not open-ended and that his government must step up to the challenge. "If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people, and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people," he said. "Now is the time to act. The prime minister understands this." He also stressed that a successful strategy for Iraq is going to take more than just military operations. "Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighbourhoods and communities," he said. "So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced." [1]

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[1]. Ibid.

Part of this effort was to confront Iran and Syria, which, the President said, allow terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of Iraq, and generate support for Iraq's success among its regional neighbours. The challenge playing out across the broader Middle East is more than a military conflict," he said. "It is the decisive ideological struggle of our time." [1]

The eighteen Legislative, Security and Economic Benchmarks, and GAO's Assessment as of Sept., 2007: [2]

Legislative Benchmarks:

   i. Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and completing the constitutional review.

    Status   : Committee formed but amendments not approved by the Iraqi legislature and no referendum scheduled.

    Assessment   : Not Met

   ii. Enacting and implementing legislation on de- Baathification.

    Status   : Laws drafted.

    Assessment: Not Met

   iii. Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shiia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.

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[1] . Ibid.

[2] . Public Law 110-28 requires The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) to report to Congress by September 1, 2007, on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 Benchmarks contained in the Act. The Benchmarks stem from commitment first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. This assessment has been done after GAO's revision of government documents and interviews with officials from U.S. agencies; the UN; and the government of Iraq. This assessment was enhanced by multiple visits to Iraq and by approximately 100 Iraq-related audits they have completed since May 2003.

Status   : 3 of 4 components drafted; none being considered by parliament.

Assessment: Not Met.

iv.   Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous
      regions.

      Status   : Law enacted; implementation scheduled for 2008.

      Assessment: Partially Met.

v.   Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an independent High
      Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provisional council authorities,
      and a date for provincial elections.

      Status   : Commission law enacted and implemented; however, supporting laws
      not enacted.

      Assessment: Not Met.

vi.   Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty.

      Status   : No laws drafted.

      Assessment: Not Met.

vii. Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament
      program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central
      government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq.

      Status   : No laws drafted.

      Assessment: Not Met

viii. Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are
      protected.

      Status   : Legislators' rights protected; minority citizens' rights unprotected.

      Assessment: Met.

The Iraqi government "met" 1 of 8 legislative benchmarks, and "partially met" another one. By law, the rights of the minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected through provisions in the Iraqi constitution and council of representatives, however, the minorities in Iraq are still susceptible and their rights are frequently violated.

The other six benchmarks have not been met; a review of the Iraqi constitution, which leaves some fundamental issues unresolved such as expanded powers for the presidency, the resolution of disputed areas, namely Kirkuk, and power sharing between federal and regional governments over issues like the distribution of oil revenue; the legislation on de-Ba'athification reform; the Hydrocarbon legislation; the implementation of the legislation to establish provincial council authorities, provincial election law, or a date for provincial elections; and no legislation on amnesty or militia disarmament is being measured because- according to U.S. and Iraqi officials- they need a secure environment for a successful program.

Security Benchmarks:

ix. Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support to the Baghdad security plan.

Status   : Committees established.

 Assessment: Met

x. Providing three trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad operations.

Status   : Forces provided; some of limited effectiveness.

Assessment: Partially Met.

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xi.   Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in constitution with U.S. commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

   Status   : Political intervention continues.

   Assessment: Not Met.

xii.   Ensuring that Iraqi security forces are providing even-handed enforcement to the law.

   Status   : Iraqi security forces engaged in sectarian-based abuses.

   Assessment: Not Met

xiii.   Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said "the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for many outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation."

   Status   : Militia infiltration of some security forces enables some safe havens.

   Assessment : Partially Met.

xiv.   Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.

   Status   : Militia control some local security; unclear whether sectarian violence has decreased. Assessment   : Not Met.

xv.   Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighbourhoods across Baghdad.

   Status   : 32 of 34 stations established.

   Assessment: Met

xvi.   Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently.

Status   : Number of independent units declined between March and July 2007.

Assessment: Not Met.

xvii.   Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces.

Status   : Unsubstantiated accusations continue to be made.

Assessment: Not Met.

The Iraqi government met 2 of 9 security benchmarks; it has established political communications, economic, and services committees; and with the coalition assistance, 32 of the planned 34 Joint Security Stations are established. The Iraqi government "partially met" 2 benchmarks; the provision of 3 trained and ready brigades to support Baghdad's operations; and ensuring that the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation, nevertheless, opportunities to create temporary safe havens exist due to the political intervention of Iraqi government officials and the strong sectarian loyalties and militia infiltration of security forces.

The benchmark to reduce sectarian violence and eliminate militia control of local securities has not been met and remains a problem. Many U.S. and UN reports have found that militias still preserve considerable control or influence over local security in parts of Baghdad and other areas of Iraq. There was a decrease in total average daily attacks in July, 2007, but largely due to a decrease in attacks on coalition forces rather than civilians, and the level of violence stays high. The attacks have increased around

the most important religious and political events including Ramadan and elections; moreover, al-Qaida preserves the ability to perform high-profile attacks.[1]

About the other 4 unmet security benchmarks, it has been found that; the Iraqi government does not always allow Iraqi commanders to make tactical and operational decisions without political intervention, where some operational decisions have been based on sectarian interests; continuous sectarian-based abuses on the part of Iraqi security forces; from March to July 2007, the number of Iraqi army units capable of independent operations had decreased instead of increasing; and the undermining and the false accusations of the Iraqi political authorities continues against the Iraqi Security Force personnel, the issue that is undermining the independence and non-sectarianism of the ISF. According to the U.S. government the de-Baathification Commission are fabricating charges against Sunni officers to cleanse the military units from Sunnis. Furthermore, the ISF's formal command structure is compromised by influential sectarian leaders linked to the security ministries which led to the detention of several military officials. These tactics are used largely against Sunni officials at Ministry of Defence, and are not used at the predominantly Shiiaa Ministry of Interior. The government support for the ISF has been uneven and sectarian activities have been ignored in many occasions.

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[1] . U.S. Department of State: Initial Benchmark Assessment Report on Iraq, pp. 10

Economic Benchmark:

xviii.　Allocating and spending $ 10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis.

Status　　　: Funds allocated but unlikely to be fully spent.

Assessment: Partially Met.

This benchmark has been "partially met". Iraq's inability to spend its own resources to build the infrastructure and deliver essential services is an economic challenge to Iraq's self-reliance as president Bush explained. The Iraqi government has not been able to spend its resources on capital projects. In 2006 the government spend only 22% of its non- provincial capital projects and reconstructing budget. On the other hand, in the oil sector that provides over 90% of Iraq's revenue, the government was able to spend less than 3% of the $3.5 billion allocated for oil reconstruction projects. However, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reported that the ministries may have not spent all of the funds, but instead shifted them to its subsidiaries like the State Oil Marketing Organization, which is responsible for spending a lot of the Oil Ministry's capital projects and reconstruction budget.

The Kurdistan region received a separate allocation, 16% of the total 2007 capital projects and reconstructing budget. The Kurdistan region successfully executed its budget that might be due their years of experience as a semi-autonomous region and the better security conditions they have. [1]

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[1] . GAO-07-1195 Securing, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq, pp. 65

Section B: The Alternative Solutions on Iraq:

1. **Sending More Troops;**

Senator John McCain, has always supported larger military presence in Iraq, however, he cautions against redeploying more troops to the capital, Baghdad, because it will destabilizes other parts of Iraq. 1 The Iraq Study Group contended that the ongoing increases in U.S. troops would not solve the basic cause of violence, which is the absence of national reconciliation. They also contended that without political progress security can never be sustained.2

2. Retreat out of Iraq;

Anti-war Democrats and some republicans advocate this action with different exit strategies. George Friedman, who is the founder of Stratfor, a strategic consulting firm, says that the U.S. with 130,000 troops can not contain a civil war, therefore, drawing down the troops to 40,000 and base them in densely populated areas, might be more sustainable long-term while the money saved from this process can be used to train and equip more Iraqi forces.3 However, the current administration rejects this proposal contending that withdrawal will pave the way for Iran or al-Qaeda to take over.4 The Iraq Study group, on the other hand, believe that withdrawal from Iraq would produce greater sectarian violence. The results would be; major power vacuum, regional instability, more human suffering, and a threat to the world economy, which will force the U.S. to return.5

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1. Beehner, Lionel (2006), pp. 3
2. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp.39
3. Ibid, pp.3
4. Karen D. and Thomas E. R.(2007), pp. 1
5. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 38

3. Division, Decentralizing Iraq;

According to Biden-Gelb plan-1 Iraq will be divided into three strong distinct ethno-religious regions; Kurdistan, Shiiastan and Sunnistan, held together by a limited but effective central government. Gelb wrote that uniting Iraq by decentralizing "is not likely to make most Iraqis happy, but it is a plan that gives each group most of what it considers essential: re-blessed autonomy for the Kurds, some degree of autonomy and money for the Sunnis, and for the Shiites, the historic freedom to rule themselves and enjoy their future riches." Many experts say that Iraq is most likely to take the shape of a federation; however, there will be different variations to this outcome.2 Critics to the plan say that the problem will be with the division of the oil revenues, especially for the Sunnis poor areas, others say that this outcome will just cause more sectarian violence. Judith S. Yaphe from the National Defense University who supports the president's strategy wrote in the "Los Angeles Times: "None will be satisfied with a "Sunnistan-Kurdistan-Shiastan" divide, this would almost certainly spawn civil war. Iraq's Kurdish, Sunni Arab, and Shiite communities are not monoliths; each has its secularists and Islamists, rich and poor, oligarchs and peasants." On the other hand Michael O'Hanlon, who is a senior at the Brooking Institution, explained that "the time maybe approaching when the only hope for a more stable Iraq is soft partition. 3 As for the Iraq Study Group, they believe that the costs of decentralizing Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central government would be too high for multiple reasons; regional borders will be hard to draw because Iraq's population is not separated properly, the 18 Iraqi provinces contain mixed population as well as Baghdad and other major cities. A

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[1]. Joseph Biden is the chairman of the U.S. foreign Relations Committee and a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, and Leslie Gelb is the president emeritus of the influential Council of Foreign Relations (CFR). The two put the plan together, the Biden-Gelb plan in 2006. See Trinicenter.com-Iraq: Divide et Impera, Stephen Gowans, August 22, 2007.

[2]. Beehner, Lionel (2006), pp.3

[3]. Brooking Institution is associated with the Rockfellers, and it is one of the most influential US ruling class policy-making organizations. See Trinicenter.com-Iraq: Divide et Impera, Stephen Gowans, August 22, 2007.

quick separation will cause mass population movements, ethnic cleansing,

empowerment of militias, failure of the Iraqi security forces, destabilization of

neighbouring countries, and attempts to control Iraq's regions by neighbouring states.

Nevertheless, they also believe that such separation might be a possible outcome of the

continued instability, and if events forced the U.S. to move in such a direction, the U.S.

should be able to contain and manage the spread of violence, humanitarian

consequences, and minimize regional instability. However, the U.S. must strongly

support a strong central government, capable of delivering fair oil revenues to the

different regions.[1]

The division of Iraq, with a weak central government outcome will grant the U.S. a

great valid excuse to keep permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq to secure the oil

wells, and save the U.S national interests. More importantly, it is in the strategic interest

of Iran, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. It weakens the possibility of Iraq emerging as a

united strategic competitor in the region, reduces the pressure on these regimes for

reform, and not mentions the decreased danger posed by the home-grown, exported

jihadists on these status-quo regimes.[2]

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[1]. Baker-Hamilton Report, (2006), pp. 39
[2]. Herd, Graeme P. (2005), pp. 1

Section C: The Current Iranian, Egyptian, Saudi Arabian, and Syrian Dynamics:

After few months from the American invasion on Iraq, the pro-western Arab governments started to doubt the American ability to control the situation and establish a reliable government. Many Arab experts realized that it is only a matter of time before the Islamists dominate the power in the country-with or without Saddam-. [1] What influenced the Arab policy formulation process were the Iranian influence and the prevalence of Shiites and Kurds whom Tehran had sponsored for years.

Negotiations between the chief of Egyptian intelligence, Gen. Omar Suleiman, and his Iranian counterpart, Ali Yunisi in July 2003 were the inventive event.[2] Discussions according to Arab security officials were mainly about the cooperation in covert operations and insurgency against the U.S. presence in Iraq. A cross border access into Iraq for Egyptian intelligence was granted to Egypt, while Cairo encouraged Tehran to send fighters to Iraq to join the Anti-American Jihad. Likewise, Egypt would also give the Egyptian Islamists permission and support to travel to Iraq through Sudan and Syria to also participate in the Iran-sponsored Islamist insurgency, since they pose a threat to Mubarak's own rule.[3] Eventually, Suleiman assured Yunisi that Cairo was keen to make reasonable deals with the Islamists, the thing that would strengthen Mubarak's dynasty in Egypt. Consequently, and during the same month of July and August, a major escalation in the Guerrilla war started, the U.S. officials were still blaming Saddam's supporters, while the real driving force were the Islamists, who for them the struggle is not only for the future of Iraq, but for the whole Arab Muslim world.

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[1]. Bodansky, (2004),pp. 389

[2] . Discussions were mainly about the expulsion of Egyptian Al-Qaeda, held in Iran, namely Shawki al-Islambuli, who attempted President Mubarak and Suleiman's assassination in 1995.

[3]. Ibid, pp. 390

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This escalation was causing an increased discontent within the population; ethnic tensions were growing even among those who were considered on good terms with the U.S., like the Kurds and Turkman. The escalation of the Anti-America guerrilla warfare which began in summer 2003 was the result of a coordinated effort between Saddam Hussein's Baathist force, Osama bin Laden's Islamist force, the sponsoring states of Iran and Syria, and finally elements of the Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, and Pakistani governments and intelligence services, where they all shared one vision; the collapse of the American presence in Iraq, and preventing Washington from trying to take on any of them in the future. By escalating the Jihad through a Baghdad-based, Iran-sponsored, all Islamists "high command" cooperating with Baath experts, another HizbAllah was born in Iraq, assigned to Muqtada al-Sader. Ahmad Shalabi identified the increased corporation between Iran and Iraqi Sunni and Shiite groups as the key to Iraq's future "Iran is winning this war, not America," he explained.[1]

Considering the Situation in Iraq, an emergence of a strong, democratic state is a far fetched goal for the U.S. to achieve. The American failure to normalize life in Iraq has ignited religious and ethnic social frameworks that are all anti-American. This transformation of society empowered the escalating guerrilla warfare, while the U.S. was still chasing the old Baathist forces and failed in preventing the new jihadist forces, who are better trained and more disciplined than the pro-Saddam Baathist.[2] However, according to President Bush, withdrawal from Iraq is not possible in the near future "It would mean surrendering the future of Iraq to al-Qaeda," if U.S. troops left soon he

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[1]. Bodansky (2004), pp. 396
[2]. Ibid, pp. 490

said, they would "have to return at some later date to confront an enemy that is even more dangerous." [1]

The American military and intelligence services are powerless against this type of guerrilla warfare; moreover, they routinely intensified the situation by firing at random innocent Iraqi civilians whenever attacked. Although the jihadists came from different backgrounds and affiliations, nevertheless, they have created one coherent campaign of strategic anti-American Iraqi insurgency.

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[1]. Karen D. and Thomas E. R.(2007), pp. 3

Conclusion:

Peacekeeping and nation-building have always been the responsibility of the United-Nations, who grants such operations legitimacy and increases the willingness of the conflicting parties to pursue peaceful negotiations. Unilateral actions, however, are not only less desirable, but less effective as well, especially if driven by national or regional interests.

Recently, peace-builders try to flee their uncertainty by relying on past or current models in the field, but universal models can be misleading in certain countries, like Iraq. Failing to integrate the views of the local population can lead to grave, avoidable mistakes, while lack of good intentions or knowledge in engineering post-conflict operations is what poses catastrophes. Despite the U.S. knowledge and experience in the field, their practices in Iraq have proved either pure ignorance or total arrogance, and in either case, their accountability and credibility have fallen profoundly to take on any critical responsibilities, precisely, nation-building. This lack of accountability leads to many problems, mainly; encourages the engagement in exploitive and criminal behaviour, especially when nation-builders are accused of rape, killing, and abuse like Abu Ghraib and other sites around Iraq. These crimes and the self interested practices, damaged the American occupation in Iraq, undermined its legitimacy and effectiveness, and made any prospect for peace and development impossible to achieve, or at least with the current Bush Administration's views and visions.

The U.S. and Iran are waging their war on the Iraqi soil. The Domino Effect -that was the war anticipated result- failed and gave the opposite result with the neighbouring Rogue States, mainly Iran and Syria. The American vision did not see the light. Six

years since the invasion and up to this writing the death toll is still between 150-200 Iraqis "per day", while the only winner so far is Iran.

The U.S. dismantled the country's institutions and formed a government based on sectarianism, highly connected to Tehran, with each party supported by its own militias, armed and committing crimes of humanity in almost every city in Iraq, all this bred civil war and a new sectarian points of view.

The people of Iraq are still arguing that there has never been a problem with Sunni, Shiiaa, and Kurds living together. The current extreme level of violence in Iraq should not be understood as a result of rooted hatred between the different religious and ethnic groups, but should be observed as a result of a planned effort aiming at destroying the country by eliminating the Iraqi's elites, stimulate fanaticism and violence between the different groups, and destroying the conditions for stable economic life. This ethnic war was created by many players namely the U.S., Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, by strengthening the fundamental islamists, out and inside Iraq to fight the American occupation by all means. Since 2003, the death toll estimates range from 600.000 to 1.3 million Iraqis.[1]

The American's have not learned from the British mandate in Iraq. The U.S. administration is still trying to make sense of a society which they have no knowledge of. Instead they grasped aspects of the shadow state as authentic representations of the Iraqi polity. Consequently, they are reproducing Saddam Hussein's structures, guaranteeing his own grip on power.[2] Like the British in the 1920s, the U.S. administration is yielding to "primordialization". They thought that the Iraqi people will

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[1]. First Draft Report Of The Mission To Iraq, 2-10 January 2007
[2]. Dodge, Toby (2003), **Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied**, Colombia University Press, New York, pp.159

reimagine their society as dominated by the premodern structures of tribes and religious authority, which was the same element that created the Baathist rule. There is strong evidence that the British and the Americans did that in the early days of the occupation.[1]

Dividing Iraq into three distinct ethno-religious regions; Kurdistan, Shiiastan and Sunnistan, held together by weak federal government, would be a favourable solution for almost all players, especially for the U.S., giving them great valid excuse to keep permanent military presence in Iraq to provide security, and save the U.S national interests. By far, that would be what they first came for. One cannot help but to wonder; why would the U.S. with all its capacity and great intelligence, ignore all the productive practices in Nation-Building, and commit all these deadly mistakes to the occupied? Or with solutions like this the war would have served its purpose? Then, democracy, justice or the reconciliation of Iraq would be matters of a secondary concern? The effort put by the Americans in this war is massive, in terms of money, time and manpower, more than any other previous attempt in history, yet, it is failing, and it is breeding universal disasters and chaos.

Many members of the shadow state in Iraq are still running state institutions and still guarantee order. The U.S. administration, which is short of resources and time due to the domestic pressure, are using these individuals to provide violent stability at a low cost. However, if this is the path chosen by the U.S. and allies, the shadow state once again will dominate as the international supervision weakens. Consequently, and as Toby Dodge wrote in his book "Inventing Iraq": "In the medium- term, Iraq will be prone to insecurity- mitigated only by the degree of ruthlessness and efficiency exhibited by the new rulers in Baghdad. The long- term result can be expected, at best,

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[1]. Ibid, pp.159

to resemble Egypt, with a population demobilized and resentful. The state will dominate society through the use of high levels of organized violence. The governing elite will colonize all aspects of the economy and corruption will be the major source of the regime's longevity."

The Iraqis must be held responsible too, for the ongoing, sobering human disasters in killing each other. Iraq's top priority should be the elimination of the operational capacity of anyone who is trying to promote violence against Iraqis, and disable their tools, namely; the organized militias and criminal gangs inside and outside the Iraqi security forces. National reconciliation would be the ideal end game for Iraq, maintaining Iraq in one piece, united and safe. Intervention of ideas and effective media support, educating the people to fight for their country not against it, eliminating terrorist movements and stop their "death recruitments"[1], all that would provide valid reasons for children, men and women in Iraq to live and fight for, namely give them jobs, and good safe living to rebuild Iraq, and spare the region from imminent disasters.

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[1] . Al-Qaeda and other fundamental groups are training and hiring children ranging from 8-13 years old to kill and be killed, as evident on tapes shown on television by AL-Arabia news channel, late 2007.

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السياسة الامريكية لبناء الامم : العراق كحالة دراسة

٢٠٠٣ - ٢٠٠٧

اعداد
سامية سلامة شطارة

المشرف
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الملخص :

موضوع هذة الدراسة هو السياسة الأمريكية لبناء الأمم، و الحالة العراقية. حيث تعتبر سياسة بناء الامم من أكثر السياسات الخارجية المثيرة للجدل، وذلك منذ تطور مفهوم عمليات حفظ السلام التابعة للأمم المتحدة الى سياسة خارجية أمريكية، تقضي بأعادة بناء الهيكل السياسي، الاقتصادي، و الاجتماعي للبلد المنكوب و اعادة النظام و السلام فيه.

قامت الولايات المتحدة بغزو العراق عام ٢٠٠٣ بحجة محاربة الارهاب و اعادة بناء هيكله السياسي والاقتصادي. ممارسات الادارة الأمريكية فى العراق تقوم على أساس مبدأ تحقيق المصلحة الأمريكية فقط في بناء الأمم، مما يصعب من رؤيتها في مثل هذا الدور، و خصوصا من خلال سياساتها الحالية هناك. الوضع في العراق ما زال في تدهور مستمر، و معدل القتلى العراقيين من مدنيين و عسكريين ما زال يتراوح بين ١٠٠- ١٥٠ قتيل يوميا.

انتصرت الولايات المتحدة في حربها الباردة ضد الاتحاد السوفيتي بعد اعادة بناء ألمانيا و اليابان بنجاح لم يسبق له مثيل. الذي ساعدها على انجاح عملياتها هناك عوامل عدة منها؛ التخطيط المسبق، توفير الموارد الهائله، الشرعية الدولية، الظروف المحيطة بهذه البلاد و التي كانت تتمتع بنوع من التقدم و الديمقراطية مع القبول النسبي للتدخل الامريكي و الدولي فيها. من جهة أخرى، فشلت الولايات المتحدة بأكثر محاولاتها الأخرى حول العالم، تاركة وراءها حروب أهلية و مجاعات، لا زال بعضها يعاني منها ليومنا هذا.

يعتمد نجاح اعادة بناء الأمم، كما أقر معظم الباحثون و اعتمادا على التجارب السابقة، على عوامل عدة، و كان أهمها نسبة الجهد المبذول في مثل هذه العمليات المعقدة من توفير الموارد المالية، البشرية، والوقت اللازم لاتمام عملية البناء، و التي تستغرق بالمعدل عشرة سنوات.

الحالة العراقية مختلفة تماما، و لا ينطبق عليها أي من العوامل السابقة الذكر، ما عدا نسبة الجهد المبذول؛ العامل الذي لم يعد محدد للنجاح بعد الممارسات الأمريكية في العراق للاسباب التالية:

١. قامت الولايات المتحدة بغزو العراق دون موافقة المجتمع الدولي، و الأهم من ذلك عدم الأخذ بعين الاعتبار أي من الدروس المأخوذة من تجاربها السابقة و العديدة في هذا المجال. حيث قامت بدورها بتولي عملية اعادة البناء بمساعدة بعض الحلفاء الذين لهم مطامع اقتصادية و استراتيجية فيها، و أوكلت اليهم مهام ثانوية في حفظ الأمن و ابار البترول.
٢. استراتيجية الولايات المتحدة في العراق تتماشى مع قدراتها، و من دون أي تخطيط يذكر لكيفية معالجة الوضع بعد الحرب في المجتمع العراقي.
٣. لم يتم تطبيق أي من الممارسات المتعارف عليها لانجاح مثل هذه العمليات كالتمثيل الصحيح لمختلف الاحزاب و ضرورة مشاركة كافة شرائح المجتمع في عملية البناء، بل قامت باختيار حكومة موالية لها و في موضع شبهات للشعب العراقي.

٤ . اختارت الادارة الأمريكية بعض الممارسات الصحيحة من توفير الدعم المالي، البشري، و أخذ الوقت الكافي و التي رأت أنها ضرورية لتحقيق مصالحها السياسية، الاقتصادية و الاستراتيجية فقط دون النظر لمصلحة العراق الوطنية المستقبلية.

لا يمكن اعتبار احتلال العراق محاولة لاعادة بناءة و ارساء الديمقراطية فيه كما يدعي الساسة الامريكيين من المحافظين الجدد، بل هي مجرد حرب كان من الضروري شنها لاسباب مختلفة أهمها؛ انقاذ الاقتصاد الأمريكي و الدولار، السيطرة على ثاني أكبر احتياطي نفط في العالم، التصدي للهيمنة الايرانية في المنطقة، و حماية أمن و مصالح اسرائيل .